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SELF-ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THE
LIMITS OF COERCION
Robert E. Scott*
Paul B. Stephan**

International law provides an ideal context for studying the effects of freedom from coercion on
cooperative behavior. To be sure, almost all academic discussions of the subject begin by asking
whether international law constitutes “law.” We will duck this problem by observing that the category
of all “international law” is too big and heterogenous to permit useful analysis. Whether to regard, say,
the rules governing the conduct of war or international humanitarian law as “law”1 presents radically
different issues than does analyzing the legal character of the Treaty of Rome (the constitutive
instrument of the European Community) 2 or the Warsaw Convention (the instrument governing
contracts for the carriage of goods in international air transit).3 Instead, we will focus on a subset of
international law, namely enforcement mechanisms for treaties and other agreements among states, and
in particular agreements that involve the joint production of social welfare.4

By limiting our inquiry to welfare-enhancing international agreements, we necessarily exclude
customary international law. The existence and significance of this body of norms and obligations is
a hardy perennial among specialists. 5 But the lack of any clear consensus as to what customary
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See James D. Morrow, The Laws of War, Common Conjectures, and Legal Systems in International Politics, 31 J. LEG.
STUD. S41 (2002); James D. Morrow, The Institutional Features of the Laws of War, 55 INT’L. ORG. 971 (2001); Oscar
Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984).
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We focus our attention on welfare-enhancing international agreements in order to examine systematically the enforcement
questions that are at the heart of our inquiry. See notes 18-27 infra and accompanying text.
5
On the meaning and function of customary international law, see Anthony A. D’Amato, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971); Michael Byers, CUSTOM , POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONALLAW (1999); Karol Wolke, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONALLAW (2nd rev. ed. 1993); Curtis
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international law means or does, along with the extremely spotty practice of courts regarding its
invocation, discourages us from attempting to explore its functional effects.6 Moreover, to the extent
customary international law has any coherence, it seems to comprise an amalgam of tort and property
rules, and we intend to explore the contributions that contract theory specifically can make to our
understanding of the field. Accordingly, we will consider the enforcement only of express instruments
entered into by states.7

Second, we distinguish among international agreements not according to their subjects or objects,
but according to the enforcement mechanisms attached to them. This approach allows us to concentrate
on the instrumental aspects of agreements, as distinguished from their moral or symbolic functions. We
defend this focus by arguing that the existence of observable instrumental effects has distinct
expressive value even to those who find only the moral or rhetorical aspects of law interesting. 8
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position,
119 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529 (1993); Jack L.
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999); Phillip R. Trimble, A
Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 665 (1986).
6
Another reason for preferring agreements to custom is that the former reduce the “counterfactual problem” that arises when
departures from custom occur, namely determining whether the departure constitutes a defection or adherence to a new custom. See
Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV.1281 (2003).
On the role of the treaty formation process in addressing the counterfactual problem, see John K. Setear, Law in the Service of
Politics: Moving Neo-Liberal Institutionalism from Metaphor to Theory by Using the International Treaty Process to Define
“Iteration”, 37 VA . J. INT’ L. 641 (1997). For an extension of the point to noncoercive third-party dispute resolution based on
international agreements, see Tom Ginsburg & Richard McAdams, Coordination at the Core: An Expressive Theory of International
Adjudication (May 2003).
7

We acknowledge that the distinction between an international agreement that looks to the joint production of social welfare
and other types of international law might not always be clear, inasmuch as the scope of some agreements may be more tacit than
formal, and most instances of customary law are said to rest on consent. For the vast majority of cases, however, the distinctionseems
sufficiently clear to provide a useful basis for analysis. We focus on explicit state commitments, in contrast to obligations inferred from
behavior regularities or expressions of conventional wisdom. We mean to include in our analysis agreements to which at least two
states are parties, including agreements to which non-state actors, such as private firms or international organizations, also join. We
do mean to exclude multilateral agreements that have a purely coordination as opposed to a productive function. We also will not
consider contracts between a single state and private actors, although some aspects of our analysis may be applicable to such
agreements. For a general discussion, see Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract,
1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 313 (1999).
8
Our focus on enforcement strategies distinguishes this paper from research on the question of whether the parties to an
international agreement seek to create a binding obligationunder internationallaw. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International
Agreements (Jul. 2003); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 VA .
J. INT’L L. 113 (2003); Kenneth W. Abbot, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter & Duncan Snidal, The
Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401 (2000); Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements (Draft 2004).
Some agreements that do not create an obligation under international law nonetheless invoke self enforcement mechanisms, while
finding that an agreement creates an obligation under international law does little to determine what enforcement mechanisms apply.

2

Our thesis is straightforward: Framers of international agreements, no less than the authors of
private contracts, can choose between self enforcement and coercive third-party mechanisms to induce
compliance with the commitments they make. Studies of individual contracting provide some evidence
that coercive sanctions may crowd out self enforcement, implying that too great a propensity by
external actors to intervene in the contractual relationship may produce welfare losses. We explore
the possibility that too much coercive third-party enforcement similarly can reduce the value of
international agreements.

A casual acquaintance with the field may leave the impression that international agreements can
only be self-enforcing. No international sheriff works in the background to compel compliance and
punish breaches of treaties.9 Agreements may fashion their own enforcement mechanisms, but these
have no greater authority than the instrument that creates them. Consider a nonaggression treaty, such
as that Hitler’s Germany signed with Stalin’s Soviet Union in 1939.10 Nominally, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact called for arbitration of all disputes between the parties, but the only sanction for violation
was retaliation, a power that existed regardless of the Pact’s provisions.11 Without international law
enforcement institutions, it would seem that all international agreements must stand or fall on the
uncoerced good behavior of the parties.

A somewhat more sophisticated approach would find an analogy between international agreements
and the many kinds of communally enforced contracts. Medieval trade fairs, contemporary cotton,

Just as scholars contend that choosing to make an agreement “legal” signals information about the parties’ intent, Jack L. Goldsmith
& Eric A. Posner, supra, at 132-34; Andrew T. Guzman, note 8, at 47-50, we maintain that the choice of enforcement mechanism
reveals valuable information about the parties and their perception of the future.
9
See H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209 (1961):
It is indeed arguable, as we shall show, that international law not only lacks the secondary rules of change and adjudication which
provide for legislature and courts, but also a unifying rule of recognition specifying “sources” of law and providing general criteria
for the identification of its rules.
10
Treaty of Non-Aggression, Aug. 23, 1939, F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., 1939 RGBl. II, No. 38, translated in 7 DOCUMENTS ON
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1918-1945, at 245 (Series D) (U.S. Dept. of State 1956); Secret Additional Protocol, Aug. 23, 1939,
in 7 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra, at 246. For a more general discussion of Nazi Germany’s use of the forms
of international law, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational
Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEG. STUD. S115, S116-17 (2002).
11
Article V of the Treaty contemplated “if necessary” the establishment of arbitration to resolve disputes between the parties,
but the Soviet Union chose other means to respond to the German flouting of the agreement by its invasion in force on June 22, 1941.
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diamond and rubber dealers, and lenders in U.S. immigrant communities, for example, have employed
social sanctions based on communal solidarity as a substitute for third-party enforcement of
commitments.12 Similarly, some international lawyers argue, the “international community” induces
compliance with agreements by maintaining a running assessment of the law-abiding quality of nation
states and using social signals to deter violations of international commitments.13

A deeper examination reveals, however, that international agreements come with an array of
enforcement mechanisms based on various institutional arrangements. Parties may choose to rely only
on self-enforcement mechanisms, buttressed by social sanctions wielded by the international
community, and most do so. But countries also can turn to external mechanisms backed by credible
coercive authority in order to resolve their disputes. Agreements may invoke these mechanisms
explicitly, or third-party enforcement bodies may decide on their own to enforce an agreement.
International agreements, much like private contracts, necessitate choices about enforcement structure,
and particularly the mix between external enforcement and self enforcement.

The architects of international law long have remarked on the superficial similarity between
international agreements and private contracts.14 But functional analyses of these formally similar
instruments traditionally has come from different directions. A substantial literature explores self
enforcement of international agreements, for the most part assuming that no other means exist for
inducing compliance.15 On the other hand, legal scholars of private contracts until recently have

12

For studies of these phenomena, see Janet Tai Landa, TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY:BEYONDTHENEW INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS OF ETHNIC TRADING NETWORKS, CONTRACT LAW , AND GIFT EXCHANGE 112 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law
in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA . L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lan Cao,
Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841 (1999); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in
Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857 (1989); Eric A Posner, The Regulation of Groups:
The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996).
13
For a synthesis of the argument that compliance with international obligations depend critically on the perceptions of other
nations about compliance, see Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823
(2002).
14

See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.): “A treaty is in its nature a contract between
two nations, not a legislative act.”
15
See, e.g., Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Multilateral Tariff Cooperation During the Formation of Free Trade
Areas, 38 INT’L ECON. REV. 291 (1997); Robert Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT’L ORG. 1 (1986);
Giovanni Maggi, The Role of Multilateral Institutions in Trade Cooperation, 89 AMER. ECON. REV. 190 (1999); John K. Setear,
Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the
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focused mostly on the coercive aspects of enforcement, and have slighted both the role of self
enforcement in explaining contract compliance and the interplay between self enforcement and
coercion. It would seem that, however compelling is the contract metaphor in explaining bargaining
behavior and expectations, these two categories of agreements occupy different universes in terms of
their functions and behavioral effects.

But in the past few years, scholars have begun to explore how coercive enforcement of private
contracts affects self enforcement.16 Although these inquiries are too early and tentative to support firm
conclusions, a growing body of evidence indicates that, as to individuals, the relationship between
self enforcement and coercion is complex and, in at least some areas, rivalrous. The individual
characteristics that facilitate valuable self enforcement may be suppressed once one introduces
coercive sanctions.

It is not too great a leap to ask whether the insights into individual decisionmaking and incentives
suggested by these studies of private contracts might also inform our understanding of state-to-state
behavior. We argue that, in spite of the obvious differences between state and individual decisionmaking, enough similarities exist to make the inquiry worthwhile. Using analytic moves worked out in the
context of private contracts, we make two general claims about international agreements, one
conventional and one controversial. First, we maintain that one usefully can evaluate efforts to frame
and implement international agreements in terms of optimal enforcement structure. Choosing from a
broad range of normative criteria, one still can distinguish between better and worse enforcement
strategies. Second, we argue that the optimal enforcement structure for any particular international
agreement will depend on both the goals of the agreement and the context in which it designed and
implemented. Because these goals and contexts are diverse, the set of optimal enforcement structures
is heterogenous. Some optimal enforcement structures will depend largely on self enforcement, while
others will not.

Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 VA . L. REV. 1 (1997); Paola Conconi & Carlo Perroni, Self-Enforcing
International Agreements and Domestic Political Credibility (CESifo Working Paper No. 988) (Jul. 2003).
16
See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2003); Alan Schwartz
& Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L. J. 541 (2003); Robert E. Scott, The Rise and
Fall of Article 2, 62 LA . L. REV. 1009 (2002).
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Central to our claim is an appreciation of the interaction of self enforcement and third-party
coercion including binding arbitration, use of international courts, and enforcement by domestic actors.
We maintain that in a far from trivial number of instances subject to international agreement, self
enforcement and coercive enforcement may be rivalrous and the optimal enforcement structure would
preclude or limit coercive enforcement. In particular, we argue that good theoretical arguments
buttress the general tendency of domestic courts not to extend their coercive powers to implement an
international agreement without a clear signal from the framers of the agreement that this coercion is
desired.17

The article proceeds in three parts. In Part I we develop an informal model that draws on contract
theory to specify the key structural determinants of the formation and enforcement of international
agreements. The model introduces the theoretical underpinnings of self-enforcing agreements and
proposes a framework for optimal enforcement design under idealized conditions based on rational
reciprocity. Part II extends this model by applying it to international agreements under more realistic
conditions. It describes the array of external and self-enforcement mechanisms available to states
affected by an international agreement and applies the rational-reciprocity framework to the different
enforcement strategies chosen by states. Part III examines the relationship between self-enforcing and
coercive methods of inducing agreement compliance. We examine the conditions under which selfenforcement and coercion may be rivals rather than complements and explore the implications of
rivalry for the design of optimal enforcement structures.

We draw a weak and a strong conclusion. We tentatively conclude that rational preferences for
reciprocity expand the domain of self-enforcing international agreements and provide a plausible

17
We recognize that this tendency has prominent exceptions and that a significant scholarly debate exists over the role of domestic
courts in enforcing international law. Some international law scholars argue that judicial uninvolvement, absent a legislative signal, is
required as a matter of constitutional structure and policy. See Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, The Structural
Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties? The Constitutionality
of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001). We also note that the same issue manifests itself in the form
of statutory interpretation, in particular whether jurisdictional statutes should be seen as authorizing judicial creation of enforcement
mechanisms for certain treaties. The latter issue currently is before the Supreme Court. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3rd
664 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 807 (2003). We profess agnosticism as to the
constitutional and statutory debates. Our argument, rather, is that a default of judicial nonenforcement has desirable welfare effects.
We leave it to others to explore whether constitutional or statutory interpretation should incorporate welfare consequences.
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explanation for the reluctance of states to adopt available mechanisms for coercive enforcement. By
narrowing the domain of coercive enforcement, states can preserve space for parties to exploit
opportunities to reciprocate. Our strong conclusion is that the rational-reciprocity approach offers rich
prospects for further research that will enhance our understanding of international law.

I. A RATIONAL-RECIPROCITY APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

In this Part, we first ask the threshold question of why states choose to enter agreements with other
states that constrain their future behavior rather than rely on the present exchange of entitlements or
other valuable property rights. We conclude that it is the contractual character of these agreements that
constitute their appeal. As with private contracts, an international agreement has an intertemporal
aspect: Parties agree today to do something tomorrow. But why do states enter into such commitments?
After all, international relations often are conducted without them. States, just as private parties, often
make simultaneous exchanges of entitlements for corresponding concessions, rather than exchange
promises for the later trade of these entitlements. Recall the exchanges of spies that periodically took
place at Checkpoint Charley during the Cold War. As long as simultaneity applies, a respect for each
state’s entitlements is sufficient to encourage commerce between the states, because a state will only
part with an entitlement if it values more highly what is offered in exchange. Contract enforcement
would be unnecessary to support welfare-enhancing trades (of any sort) between nations.

But in contrast to simultaneous exchanges, a contract is a set of promises regarding future
behavior. Such promises are costly to make and to memorialize. To understand the role of enforcement
in relation to contracting behavior, one must explain why enforcement will induce states to incur these
costs.

A. Why Write International Agreements?

To answer the question of why states choose to enter enforceable agreements that constrain their
future actions, we begin with several simplifying assumptions (that we then relax in Part II). Assume
a world of nation states, each governed by a class of rational elites that seek to maximize the welfare
7

of their citizenry. 18 Further assume that states have assets that they can trade and invest, including
“property” inherent to sovereign states such as regulatory jurisdiction, military power and revenuecollection capabilities.19 Finally, assume that some “trades” of this “property” may enhance welfare
– put simply, assume that complete autarchy of all nations is not the most desirable end state.

As with private contracting parties, our hypothetical nation states face the canonical contracting
problem of ensuring efficient ex post trade and efficient ex ante investment.20 We can assume that each
state will ensure efficient trade without the need for enforceable agreements. For example, if State A
agreed to trade ten units of an economic good to State B, but it turns out that trading twenty units would
maximize joint gains, then the parties can modify the agreement to provide for delivery of the larger
quantity. But ensuring efficient investment is more difficult. The investments we have in mind would
include the production of specialized goods or services, the development of human capital specific
to a particular relationship, and research to acquire information about future economic or political
conditions. Imagine, for example, an arms control treaty that requires a state to pass up the design and
implementation of a particular weapons system, or a trade regime that makes the development of a
particular product (say, a type of aircraft) valuable as long as other states will allow their firms to

18

State welfare is obviously a mushy term, but we use it here as synonymous with shared conceptions of “the national interest.”
The key element of this move is that we assume the absence of agency costs. We relax this assumption at notes 73-77 infra and
accompanying text.
19

For exploration of the analogy of sovereign regulatory jurisdiction to a private property right, see Joel P. Trachtman, An
Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA . J. INT’L L. 1 (2001); Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services
under GATS, NAFTA and the EC: A Regulatory Jurisdiction Analysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37 (1995). We mean
“revenue-collection capability” to encompass not just the traditional subject of tax treaties, but also the imposition of duties, quotas
and analogous constraints on international trade.
20
Implicit in our analysis is a set of assumptions more often associated with what international relations specialists would call
rationalist institutionalism. To some extent this puts us at odds with those (self-described) realists that see state insecurity, the drive
for relative rather than absolute advantage, and exercises of coercive power as the central mechanisms in international relations. See,
e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SECURITY 5 (1994-95). Similarly, because
we believe that there exists objective factors (the possibility of gains derived from cooperation, information asymmetries, etc.) that
explain important aspects of international relations, we slight the insights of those who would emphasize the role of ideological
predispositions and culture in conditioning international relations. See, e.g., Alexander Wendt, SOCIALTHEORYOF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1999). Finally, because we emphasize joint production that presents collective actions problems, we neglect other forms
of international cooperation and uses of international law, in particular coordination problems that do not contain opportunism
problems. See, e.g., Duncan Snidal, Coordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and
Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCIENCE REV. 923 (1985). We will not seek to defend our choices here, other than note that some work in
international relations theory seems more congenial to mainstream contract theory than does others.
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purchase the good when produced. What defines these investments is their relation-specific character,
in the sense that they have little or no value if put to an alternative use.

We propose a simple example to show how enforcement is essential to ensuring these valueenhancing investments.21 Each state in our story can either produce generic economic goods that are
useful to many other states or produce specialized goods that are specific to a particular relationship
with another state. Assume that State A can produce a generic version of a particular economic good
and sell it on the world market at a price that equals cost (including a return on the selling state’s
investment). Imagine, for example, that this good consists of a particular exercise of sovereign power,
such as a decision to regulate through competition rules all transactions anywhere in the world that
have an observable economic effect on the state’s economy, that other states “purchase” this product
by adopting their own rule of regulatory jurisdiction in light of State A’s choice, and that the costs and
benefits of this product derive from the effects of all states’ regulation on global welfare.22 State A
also can produce a specialized version of the good for State B. Imagine, for example, that the
specialized “good” consists of allowing State B’s regulatory decisions to displace State A’s for a
specified range of transactions, such as the application of competition rules to producers operating
in State B.23 Assume that the cost of the generic good is $1000 and purchasing states value it at $1,500.
The cost of the investment to produce the specialized good is $2,000 and State B values it at $3,000.
21

The example that follows draws on the discussion in Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, note 16 supra, at 559-562.
22

The United States generally applies the “effects” test in the application of its antitrust laws. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). For some of the finer points involving the extent of this jurisdiction, see Empagran S.A. v. F.
Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3rd 338 (D.C. Cir.), cert granted, 124 S. Ct. 966 (2003). For purposes of analysis, we assume
that the regulationin question increases aggregate welfare, and thus does not involve significant economic rents. For debate about these
assumptions and extension of the “regulation as property” analysis, see Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90
GEO. L. J.883 (2002); Erin Ann O’Hara, Economics, Public Choice, and the Perennial Conflict of Laws, 90 GEO. L. J. 941
(2002); Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Choice of Law, 90 GEO. L. J. 957 (2002); Andrew T. Guzman, Public Choice
and International Regulatory Competition, 90 GEO. L.J. 971 (2002). If these assumptions seem unrealistic, one could conceive
a different example, say a more conventional economic good such as advanced weapons systems produced by a public-private
collaboration.
23
Cf. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) (Case 120/78), [1979] E.C.R. 649
(explaining obligation under Treaty of Rome for one state to defer to regulatory decisions of other states). For further analysis of
regulatory deference in the European Community, see Francesca Bignami, The Challenge of Cooperative Regulatory Regulations
after Enlargement in LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE (George A. Bermann & Katharina Pistor eds. 2004). For
discussion of specific proposals to allocate internationally the authority to exercise competition policy jurisdiction, see Paul B. Stephan,
Competitive Competition Law? An Essay Against International Cooperation, in ANTITRUST POLICY: COMPETITION AND
COOPERATION (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds. 2004).
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But State A’s investment to make the specialized good cannot be redeployed; thus, State A will lose
its entire investment if the agreement breaks down. For example, imagine that State A would commit
to follow State B’s competition rules and that if State B then exercised its regulatory authority to
encourage the formation of monopolies designed to exploit consumers in State A, State A could not
quickly enact new legislation reclaiming its regulatory power because of its constitutional
arrangements governing lawmaking.

Under the assumptions above, A and B would prefer to produce the specialized good when that
would maximize the contractual surplus. Using our hypothetical values, therefore, the parties would
agree to produce the specialized good: This agreement would generate a surplus of $1,000, while the
alternative would generate only a surplus of $500. Assuming that the two states are equally patient
bargainers, the parties under certain plausible assumptions about bargaining behavior would divide
the $1,000 surplus equally with a contract price of $2,500.24

Assume initially that this agreement is not enforceable. In this world, the price at which the parties
ultimately will transact would not be $2,500, because State B’s incentive to cooperate disappears
after State A invests $2,000 in the deal. After State A has made its investment, B has an incentive to
demand renegotiation of the price. It could, for example, insist that State A make trade or regulatory
concessions, such as agreeing to purchase a weapons system produced in State B, as compensation
for B’s discouragement of monopolies targeted at consumers in State A. At that point, State A would
have sunk the investment cost, which the renegotiated bargain therefore would ignore. The only
question for State A at this point is whether to trade the specialized good at some price or not to trade
at all. Because trade would produce a gross gain of $3000, while the decision not to trade produces
no value, the parties would proceed with the renegotiated transaction, dividing the $3,000 gain
equally. Under a renegotiated price of $1,500, of course, State A would lose $500 ($1,500 less its

24
We suppose that States A and B are equally patient, because they have similar costs of capital. Thus, assuming the parties
engage in “deal me out” bargaining, the parties would share the surplus equally unless one party’s next best option exceeds half of an
equal split. For discussion of the possible bargaining game and why an even split is plausible, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, note 16 supra, at 552-54.
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investment cost of $2,000). Because State A would lose its entire investment if the parties failed to
trade, it would (reluctantly) agree to the new price.25

The point of this example, of course, is that if the agreement were unenforceable, State A would
refuse at the outset to produce the specialized good even though the relation-specific investment would
maximize expected surplus. State A would anticipate the hold-up potential inherent in the investment
situation and accordingly would elect to produce generic goods instead. This outcome reduces the
joint welfare of the parties, because the generic alternative generates a social surplus of $500 while
the specialized investment would have generated a surplus of $1000. But if State B’s promise to pay
the $2,500 contract price were enforceable, the parties could cooperate in producing the valueenhancing investment. State A would then anticipate being compensated for its investment, and B
would always prefer the specialized investment with its $500 payoff rather than the general alternative
which only generates a payoff of $250.

What conclusions can we draw from this example? First, the conventional view is that contract
enforcement protects injured promisees, such as State A, who otherwise will lose their reliance
interest in the prospective deal. But this view misses the main point. If international agreements were
not enforceable, State A would not risk its reliance in the first place. Instead, as in our example, it
would elect to produce generic economic goods rather than subject itself to exploitation. The key
insight is that enforcement benefits promisors; it enables them to make credible promises to perform.
State B, in our example, wishes that it could make an enforceable promise to pay State A the $2,500
contract price. In sum, enforcement enables states to make credible promises to each other to secure
relation-specific investments that will enhance the contractual surplus.

25
We assume that the parties ignore State A’s sunk $2,000 investment cost when renegotiating the contract. There is
experimental evidence that individuals will sometimes take sunk costs into account. Thus, an investing party’s payoff in a bargain will
increase if the other party knows that the investor has spent money to prepare. See Colin Camerer, BEHAVIORALGAME THEORY8590 (2003); Lorne Carmichael & W. Bentley MacLeod, Caring About Sunk Costs; A Behavioral Solution to Holdup Problems
with Small Stakes, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 106 (2003). As we discuss below, it is an open question whether the fairness concerns
regarding sunk costs that individual experimental subjects act upon also motivate states.
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Second, this example illustrates a primary motivation for states to write enforceable international
agreements: Enforcement is essential to ensuring welfare-enhancing investments that are specific to
bilateral or multi-state relationships. Our story suggests, inter alia, why private parties have made
so little foreign direct investment (FDI) in most of the former Soviet states, relative to the levels seen
in many third-world countries.26 Most FDI is relation specific (e.g., building a factory far from the
home country, developing a mine or an oil field). Potential investors will not deal unless the host
country or local firm can make credible promises to adhere to the terms originally agreed upon, rather
than renegotiating those terms after investments had been made. Although many of the former Soviet
states have signed international agreements promising to protect foreign investment, investors have
reason to regard these promises as insufficiently credible.27

B. Enforcement and Optimal Contract Design

If enforcement enhances welfare, how should countries pursue it? What are the enforcement
choices available to states seeking to encourage relation-specific investments? A range of possibilities
exist. The options run from self-enforcement mechanisms to various forms of third-party coercion,
including a commitment to arbitration, the embedding of enforcement in valuable multilateral
organizations and direct enforcement in the promisor’s domestic courts. For present purposes,
however, we need to distinguish only between self-enforcing agreements and third-party, coercive
enforcement.

1. Self-Enforcement

26

See George T. Abed & Hamid R. Davoodi, Corruption, Structural Reform, and Economic Performance in the Transition
Economies, IMF Working Paper (Jul. 2000).
27
We discuss these agreements, some of which provide for a form of coercive enforcement, at notes 119-122 infra and
accompanying text. The post-Soviet experience suggests that the existence of some coercion simpliciter is not as significant as the
degree of coercive third-party enforcement. The degree of coercive enforcement that these agreements establish seems to have been
insufficient to meed the concerns of foreign investors. See also authorities cited at note 47 infra.
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Self-enforcing agreements provide credibility to commitments where parties contemplating
noncompliance face effective sanctions that do not depend on the actions of third-party enforcers.28
Retaliatory threats and reputation undergird the traditional analysis of this process. Consider first a
long-term relationship between a supplier and a producer in which both firms make investments in the
contract and face significant costs in switching to different partners. Both parties appreciate their own
and their counterparty’s vulnerability to opportunism. Both have a credible capacity to retaliate
against opportunism based on their capacity to withhold the expected benefits from future dealings.

A significant constraint on the efficacy of retaliatory threats, however, is the extent of the parties’
expectation of future benefits. As the term of an agreement draws to a close, the parties have fewer
future benefits that retaliation can deny them. This end-game problem plagues all relationships that
have definite concluding points. End games aside, exogenous changes that lead one or more parties
to devalue what it would gain from the agreement also diminishes the effectiveness of retaliatory
threats.

As an alternative to contractor-specific relations, agreements may invoke community-based
sanctions based on reputational losses. This mechanism involves transactors who belong to a
community that invests in the monitoring of transactor behavior, disseminates information generated
by monitoring to community members at a reasonable cost, and whose members retaliate against
noncompliers. Reputation is an effective means of self-enforcement whenever a transactor values its
reputation in this community, such as where migration to other communities entails significant costs,
and community members make the effort to impose sanctions on parties who break their agreements.29
28

There is an extensive literature on self-enforcing contracts. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market
Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 617 (1981); Lester G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing
Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27 (1980); Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 177, 201-02 (1985); Robert
E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 2005, 2031-34, 2039-44 (1987). For antecedent
work with different methodological commitments that provides rich insights into self enforcement, see Stewart Macauley, NonContractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); Stewart Macauley, An Empirical View
of Contract, 1985 WISC. L. REV. 465.
29
Reputation is most effective as a means of enforcement in homogeneous communities, where the behavior of individual parties
is a matter of general knowledge. See Janet Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An Institutional
Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. Legal Stud. 349 (1981); Avner Grief, Informal Contract Enforcement: Lessons from
Medieval Trade in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND LAW 287 (Peter Newman, ed. 1998). Lisa Bernstein
has documented as well the ability of trade associations to disseminate information about individual misbehavior and to enforce
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Like repeat play, there are constraints on the use of reputation as a self-enforcement mechanism.
Reputation cannot operate effectively if the parties are strangers to each other, when a party intends
to withdraw from the community (as distinct from ending the contract-specific relationship), or when
the benefits from opportunism exceed reputational costs.30 Thus the range of contexts in which
reputation can enhance promisor credibility, although significant, is limited.

Contract theorists recently have augmented their study of self enforcement by considering the
tendency of people to value reciprocal fairness.31 New experimental work suggests that, in certain
contexts, reciprocity is a potent additional means of self-enforcement. 32 These studies have produced
three key findings: (1) Many people deviate from purely self-interested behavior in a reciprocal
manner. Reciprocity means that in response to friendly actions, many people are much more
cooperative than predicted by the axioms of rational choice. Conversely, in response to hostile actions
many people are much more nasty and vengeful;33 (2) People repay gifts and take revenge even in one
shot interactions with complete strangers and even if such action is costly for them and yields neither
present nor future material rewards;34 and (3) This is a heterogeneous world. Some people exhibit
reciprocal fairness and others are selfish. Taking all the experiments together from countries as
diverse as Austria, Indonesia, Russia and the U.S., the fraction of fair subjects ranges from 40 to 60%
as does the fraction of subjects who are selfish. 35

boycotts and other collective sanctions. The contracting behavior of the members of the association thus becomes part of the collective
memoryof the trade group. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through
Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking
the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA . L. REV. 1765 (1996).
30
See Andrew T. Guzman, note 13 supra (discussing reputational effects and compliance with international law).
31
For fuller discussion, see Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, note 16 supra, at 1663-65.
32
See, e.g., Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993);
David K. Levine, Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments, 1 REV. ECON. DYNAM. 593 (1998); Ernst Fehr & Klaus
Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, 114 Q. J. ECON. 817 (1999); Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter, & Georg
Kirchsteiger, Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence, 65 ECONOMETRICA 833 (1997). For a
review of the literature, see Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity – Evidence and Economic Applications,
University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Working Paper No. 75, at 2-3 (2001).
33
Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, University of Zurich Institute for
Empirical Research in Economics, Working Paper No. 40, at 1 (2000).
34

Id.
Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, note 16 supra, at 1665. This finding of heterogeneity
provides a convincing explanation for the apparent anomaly of the robust evidence of reciprocal fairness in bilateral interactions and
the equally robust evidence from experiments in competitive markets where almost all subjects behave as if they were self-interested.
35
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This evidence suggests that third-party coercive enforcement may be unnecessary to enhance the
credibility of promises even in circumstances where retaliatory threats and reputation effects might
not work. As long as the fraction of reciprocally fair individuals in the relevant population is
consistent with the experimental evidence, even strangers and one-time transactors will make relationspecific investments in reliance on the promise of the other to pay. 36 We thus must consider the
existence and scope of the preference for reciprocal fairness.

Notwithstanding the predictive power of this preference in experimental settings, the theory has
yet to be seriously tested in real world contexts. Thus, any use of the fairness concept raises the
question of external validity. One critique of the experimental evidence is particularly relevant to the
application of reciprocal fairness theory to explain international treaties. All of the experimental
subjects are untrained individuals and not professional bureaucrats or politicians. Thus, it is unclear
to what extent the observed behaviors, even if they apply to the general population, also apply to the
elites that affect compliance with treaty obligations. Individuals in laboratory experiments may
respond differently than state officers, for example, because the experimental subjects do not face the
same pressures to make maximizing decisions.

We also note that the experimental evidence does not establish that the observed preferences for
reciprocity are a deeply intrenched, intrinsic motivation(and thus inconsistent with the assumption of
rational self-interest). Rather, the observed preference for reciprocity may be either a learned or a
normative behavior. It would be hardly surprising if individuals learn to devise strategies – or

The central insight is that the observed behavior is a function of the economic environment. In bilateral experiments, the presence of
a fraction of reciprocally fair individuals can create incentives for selfishtypes to make fair offers. Alternatively, in a competitive market
a few selfish players can drive the price to the competitive level and no single fair person can effect that price. Ernst Fehr & Klaus
Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity, note 32 supra, at 38-40.
36
The reciprocal fairness experiments show that it pays to write trust contracts – that is, agreements based on observable but
not verifiable conduct – even where the promisee is uncertain whether the promisor is a fair or selfish type. So long as the population
is heterogeneous (i.e., there is a significant fraction of fair types in the population), then even where the transactors are anonymous,
reciprocity yields better enforcement outcomes in experimentalsettings on average than does the alternative of coercive enforcement.
This is because even selfish parties will respond reciprocally to an offer to enter into a trust contract because of the positive probability
that the promisor will behave fairly. One reason that self-enforcement is the better strategy on average is that reciprocity is significantly
less costly than third party enforcement. Another reason is that parties to self-enforcing agreements can condition performance on
observable factors that might not be verifiable to a third party, thus enhancing joint welfare. For discussion, see Robert E. Scott, SelfEnforcing Indefinite Agreements, note 16 supra, at 1682-85.
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heuristics – that do work in real-world transactions that generally present a possibility of repeat play
and reputational effect, and then fail to adjust those strategies to the pure single iteration game in the
laboratory. 37

Moreover, there is evidence that cultures do generate norms of reciprocity. These norms are
consistent with individual self-interest because, over time, parties will be better off if they behave
fairly. Following the “over time” heuristic consistently, not making distinctions for what appear to be
one-shot interactions with strangers, may be a successful, maximizing strategy. 38 After all, sometimes
one might mistake a repeat-play game for a single-iteration game and get punished or pay an
unexpected reputational price. Thus, it is possible that a rational individual could behave in the way
the experimental economists describe as reciprocally fair (and not utility maximizing) simply because
the experiments do not take into account the costs of categorizing, and mis-categorizing, transactions.39

These speculations do not challenge the experimental evidence so much as suggest a context for
appreciating its significance. The existence of a preference for reciprocal fairness may not undermine
the rational self-interest hypothesis, but rather extend its reach. Repeat play, reputation, and a
preference for reciprocal fairness all explain why actors rationally may police their own behavior,
obviating the need for external coercion. We do not argue that the potential of self enforcement is
limitless, but rather that, working within the conventional economics framework of interested
decisionmaking, self enforcement can operate to enhance promisor credibility. We next turn to
considering more fully the relationship between repeat play and reputation, the more fully studied
mechanisms of self enforcement, and the newer reciprocal fairness research. Together these

37

On heuristics generally, see BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (Gerd Gigerenzer & Robert Selten eds.,

2000).
38

Rational actors can profit from a precommitment strategy to guard against short-term deviations from behavior that would be
inconsistent with their long term preferences. Thus, a rule such as:“respond reciprocally even in one shot interactions with strangers”
may be a successful self-command strategy to guard against mistakes in mischaracterizing repeat play and isolated interactions. For
discussion of the relevance of self-command to contract theory, see Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual
Decisionmaking: An Analysis of the Relationship Between Cognitive Error and the Management of Choice, 59 S. CAL L. REV.
329 (1986).
39
Robert E. Scott, Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, note 16 supra, at 1673-74.
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mechanisms provide the basis for a theoretical approach to agreements based on what we will call
rational reciprocity.

2. Rational Reciprocity as Adding Value to Self Enforcement

We discussed above areas where repeat play and reputational effects would not motivate rational
actors to honor their obligations. More general problems attend these mechanisms even within their
effective domains. Parties who rely on either to enforce their agreements face fundamental difficulties
both in detecting a failure of performance and in responding proportionately once nonperformance is
observed. The success of self-enforcement depends significantly on the clarity and predictability of
the threatened responses to non-performance. Selecting an appropriate response to, say, an instance
of shirking becomes more complicated when the other party’s behavior cannot readily be understood.
Parties rarely shirk by directly announcing their unwillingness to perform as promised. They typically
affirm solidarity, protest helplessness in the face of intractable problems, or act in subtle ways that
are difficult to evaluate. In other words, nonperformance is a “noisy” signal and systematic
misperception of the other’s actions may cause inappropriate responses.40

Misunderstanding of an actor’s behavior can result from many sources, including reliance on a
small sample size.41 Moreover, even if participants can observe shirking behavior, third parties may
be unable to detect it. 42 Thus, reputation will work to make promissory commitments credible only if
other parties can conveniently learn about the reasons why any particular transaction broke down.
Consequently, a reputation for trustworthiness can be difficult to establish, especially in heterogeneous
environments where most market participants are unfamiliar with any particular contracting party.
Without moral clarity, the mere fact of breakdown is not sufficient to impose a reputational cost on
either party.

40

For a fuller discussion of these issues, see John K. Setear, note 15 supra, at 86-90.
Robert Jervis, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 319-406 (1976); John K. Setear, note 15
supra, at 93-98.
42
See notes 49-51 infra and accompanying text.
41
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Even if shirking can be detected, the imposition of self-enforcing sanctions must be carefully
calibrated. Overdeterrence or excessive retaliation by the counterparty functions as the equivalent of
a breach and presents serious moral hazard problems. In addition to the risk of a disproportionately
harsh response, the parties also must consider the risk of underenforcement, which will leave
opportunism inadequately deterred. High variance in the costs of performance thus poses a major
threat to an agreement that relies on the self-enforcing discipline of repeated interactions. This
variance in expected costs correlates to a party’s temptation to shirk its obligations to perform under
the agreement.

The preceding analysis underscores the fact that self-enforcement through the threat of a loss of
reputation or repeat transactions is not costless. It requires substantial monitoring and a punitive
sanction for non-performance. Even if the breaching party understands and “accepts” the punishment,
retaliation imposes stress on any on-going relationship that may threaten its survival. All parties
therefore have an interest in augmenting their relationship within an embedded framework based on
reciprocity. The existence of such a norm makes enforcement, when necessary, easier to administer
and accept. For example and as we discuss in greater detail below, states can use trust agreements
based on reciprocity to encourage each other to behave cooperatively long enough for them to
discover a project’s long-run benefits, thus bridging the gap between short-term and long-term payoffs.

In sum, reciprocal fairness offers a particularly stable foundation for a strategy of conditional
cooperation. The strategy seems credible because it relies on behavioral responses that “go without
saying.” As a consequence, it ameliorates problems of detection and proportionality. A trust contract
requires no monitoring other than a measured response to the observable actions of the other party. 43
When a selfish response is observed, a reciprocally fair type will retaliate appropriately. 44 The
contracting parties can observe and assess each other’s behavior within the context of the contract,
rather than relying on general observations.

43

For a discussion of trust contracts, which depends on behavior that parties can observe but not verify to a third party at a
reasonable cost, see Robert E. Scott, Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, note 16 supra, at 1681-82.
44
Reciprocity, whether learned, normative or intrinsic is deeply embedded behavior. Thus, for example, the “eye for an eye and
tooth for a tooth” formulation in the Hammurabi Code was intended to restrict revenge by requiring a measured, proportional
response. See also the thirteenth century Norse epic verse, the EDDA: “ A man ought to repay gift with gift and lies with treachery.”
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3. Coercive Third-Party Enforcement

The preceding discussion demonstrates both the possibilities of self enforcement to enhance the
credibility of promises and the existence of inherent limitations to any self-enforcement regime, even
conceding that reciprocity may extend its domain. As we have observed, reputation and the discipline
of repeated interactions suffer from significant constraints. And while reciprocity may be an effective
means of self-enforcement on average, it will also have a high variance. Because there is both self
interest and reciprocity in the world, an agreement that relies on reciprocal fairness would be
inefficient whenever a single act of non-performance might lead to serious disruptive effects.
Moreover, where transactions are complex and the respective promises interrelated, a failure to
perform may not be observable at the time, and thus reciprocity, which depends on a linkage between
action and response, may not work to make the promises credible. At the time that parties exchange
complex and interactive performances, they may have difficulty determining whether one party’s
refusal to respond cooperatively in a particular instance represents unfair or selfish behavior or is an
appropriately measured, retaliatory response to an earlier instance of shirking by the other. These
complex interactions are the sorts of agreements that private commercial parties typically reduce to
legally enforceable obligations.45

For several reasons, then, coercive enforcement by third parties is a desirable option in the
optimal design of international agreements.46 Self enforcement, to be sure, involves coercion, and it
also may entail third parties who are empowered to determine the rights of the parties. Coercive thirdparty enforcement as we mean the term, however, requires both a disinterested arbiter and the
arbiter’s ability directly to impose sanctions on violators. This kind of arbiter can add value not only
by unraveling the chain of causation that produced the breakdown, but also by investing in resources
to punish a breach itself rather than leaving it to the parties to fashion a response. Moreover, the two
45

Robert E. Scott, note 28 supra, at 2050-51.
One of us has argued previously that third-party enforcement and self-enforcement regulate different aspects of the contractual
relationship. On this view, third-party enforcement functions much as a nuclear umbrella, deterring breach in those states of the world
where the payoffs from breach are substantial and exceed the range of self-enforcement. The other side of the argument is that, where
the payoffs are relatively low, and reputation and repeated interactions are effective, self-enforcement is a more efficient “conventional”
deterrent. See id. at 2044-48. See also Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretation
of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 NW . U. L. REV. 91, 116 (2000).
46

19

function are complements: The ability to impose sanctions lends credibility to the unraveling. As we
discuss below and contrary to conventional assumptions, states do have the option of designing
external and coercive enforcement into their agreements.

The necessary conditions for external enforcement, then, are a disinterested third-party referee and
a stakeholder who can impose costs or provide compensation for breach. 47 In the case of international
agreements, the choice of external enforcement can range from a multilateral tribunal (think of the
European Court of Justice) to third-party arbitration to access to domestic courts known for their
independence and endowed with credible coercive authority. 48 Of course, the same institution can
serve both functions. Because the value of enforcement derives from its capacity to make credible the
promises of the respective parties, the imposition of costs can substitute for the awarding of
compensation. Thus it is sufficient that the referee can impose proportionate sanctions on the breaching
party, even if the referee cannot provide compensation for the breach once it occurs.

4. Designing Optimal Enforcement

Assume that our hypothetical states have a choice of enforcement options, ranging from selfenforcement to coercive enforcement. How do they design an enforcement regime for any particular
agreement that maximizes the contractual surplus? The optimal means of enforcement in any given case
will depend on the effects of asymmetric information on the relative costs of the enforcement options
(including both direct costs and error costs).

a. The effects of asymmetric information. The existence of asymmetric information truncates the
set of agreements that states can write. This point requires more careful unpacking. Consider an

47

Honesty and independence are perhaps the most salient attributes of a disinterested referee. Its absence helps to explain the
relatively low levels of foreign direct investment that private parties have made in countries with weak judicial systems, which prevents
the local parties frommaking believable promises. See Douglass C. North, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONALCHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990); Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Courts, 118 Q.J. ECON.
453 (2003); Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven, Law, Property Rights and Growth, 58 J. FIN.401 (2003); Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert W. Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002);
Paul Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 503 (2001).
48
We discuss the details of these institutions in Part II. See notes 118-151 infra and accompanying text.
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information taxonomy found in the contract theory literature. Information economics attaches analytic
importance to the distinction between observable and verifiable information, but both concepts remain
somewhat imprecise. According to standard theory, a datum of information is “unobservable” if the
other contracting party cannot perceive it. A datum of information is “observable but not verifiable”
if the other party can perceive it, but cannot prove the fact to a court or other third party at an
acceptable cost. A datum of information thus is “verifiable” if a party both can observe it and
efficiently prove its existence to a third party.

The field of international relations abounds with examples of both unobservable and unverifiable
information. 49 Consider secret laboratory research on weapons systems or intelligence collection,
which states work very hard to keep unobservable. At a less dramatic level, states rarely can
determine another state’s costs in maintaining a particular tariff or exercising some range of regulatory
authority, in part because of the difficulty of ascertaining the “policy set” of alternative regulatory
choices. As for nonverifiability, consider a frequent problem in trade relations, namely an acute
industry downturn that leads to “safeguard” protection against import competition. Victims of such
barriers may be able to distinguish genuine claims of domestic injury from lax commitment to trade
obligations, but third parties have great difficulty separating the two.50 Alternatively, some evidence
exists that human rights advocates concentrate their efforts (which largely involves the production of

49

Goldsmith and Posner question the significance of information asymmetries in explaining internationalrelations. They argue that:
Most states these days are open, or do a poor job of keeping their secrets (and those insulated states, like North Korea, are for
that reason assumed to be “bad types,” in an example of the classic unraveling result in games of asymmetric information), and
one can obtain a fair indication of a state’s political stability by consulting the market’s valuation of its bonds.
Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, note 8 supra, at 137. Their argument focuses only on observability not verifiability. Market
valuationof bonds exemplifies a process by which observers reliably may observe information, in the sense that they are willing to place
bets on it in the bond market, but have great difficulty convincing a third party of the link between a particular event and a particular
change in bond prices See Kim Oosterlinck, Why Do Investors Still Hope? The Soviet Repudiation Puzzle (1918-1919) (Sep. 10,
2003) (documenting unverifiability of events affecting bond prices).
50
For an instance illustrating the difficulty in ascertaining the strength of domestic injury justifies the use of rules that force a
protecting state to signal its circumstances by absorbing higher costs, see Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A
Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” With Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991). For evidence
that third parties have difficulty verifying the strength of domestic forces triggering safeguard measures, see, e.g., United States –
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, (AB-2001-1) (reviewing
legitimacy of U.S. safeguard measure under Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards and relying on second-order observations to
justify determination).
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reputational sanctions) on state acceptance of human rights obligations, rather than on state
compliance, because of the difficulty of verifying the latter relative to the former.51

From the foregoing it follows that parties will contract for third-party enforcement only where the
relevant measures of performance are verifiable. Otherwise, the uninformed party will be subject to
risks of hidden action and hidden information. Take, for example, the hypothetical agreement between
State A and State B for the production of a specialized good. Assume that State B is unable to observe
whether State A has, in fact, invested $2000 in production costs. Because of the risk of hidden action
(or moral hazard), State B will decline to condition its promised payment on whether the promised
investment was made. Instead, State B will write a contract that conditions its performance on the
verifiable quality of the good produced by State A’s investment. The problem for the parties, however,
is that the quality required by State B may not be verifiable. If so, the parties must write a second best
contract that conditions performance on a less relevant but verifiable quality.

An inability to observe a relevant condition will further limit the ability of states to obtain
maximum value from potential transactions. In our example, State B might be willing to pay a premium
for the highest quality specialized good if it knew that State A had the skill to produce it. But if B is
unable to observe whether the producers in A are skilled or unskilled, B is vulnerable to the risk of
hidden information (or adverse selection). Because B cannot observe A’s type, B will pay only a
blended price that reflects the probability that A’s workers are unskillful. Unless states endowed with
skilled workers can somehow communicate that information, they will be unable to compete with the
unskilled workers in other states at the blended price.52 In short, if the value one
party derives from performance depends on the characteristics or actions of the other party, then the
inability to observe those characteristics or actions will render the performance in question not
contractible.

51

See Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
This is based on the assumption that it is more costly to train skilled workers than unskilled workers. See generally George
Akerloff, The Market for “Lemons:” Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 355, 366 (1970).
52
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b. Screening and signaling with preliminary agreements. In this paper, as in standard contract
theory, we treat verifiability as an exogenous variable.53 Observability, however, is an endogenous
variable. Parties can overcome some information deficits by using screening or signaling mechanisms.
For example, assume that State A and State B are contemplating a long-term investment agreement for
a specialized good. Assume that the quality of the specialized good is observable to State B but cannot
be efficiently verified to a third party. Under these circumstances, the parties have an incentive to
write a self-enforcing agreement, because the specialized performance otherwise is not contractible.
But assume that State A has no history with State B that provides the basis for a reputation for
trustworthiness; nor does the prospect of future interactions discipline A’s behavior. State A might
propose a trust contract that relies on B’s generosity to respond in kind once A invests, but A is unable
to observe whether B is reciprocally fair or selfish. The assumption of heterogeneity implies,
therefore, that State A risks losing a major investment by responding with enhanced efforts to a selfish
party who subsequently fails to perform.

One solution is for the parties to design a screening mechanism so that State A can determine State
B’s preference for reciprocity. For example, State A and State B can enter into a preliminary
agreement in which B promises to pay A for investing the necessary efforts to produce one unit of the
specialized economic good and to pay A a bonus if the product proves satisfactory to B. This
preliminary agreement, simple in form, offers a clearly-defined opportunity to reciprocate. It thus
permits the parties to learn more about each other’s taste for reciprocal fairness.54 In this case,
potential transactors are not only subject to observation, but they must spend considerable time
53

The assumption that verifiability is exogenous is made for convenience, but, in fact, whether a measure of performance is
verifiable or not is subject to some party control. See, e.g., Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Measurement Distortion and Missing
Contingencies in Optimal Contracts, 2 ECON. THEORY 1 (1992); Chris Sanchirico & George G. Triantis, Evidence Arbitrage:
The Fabrication of Evidence and the Verifiability of Contract Performance, University of Virginia School of Law, Law and
Economics Research Paper Series, No. 02-17 (Dec. 2002).
54
Robert E. Scott, Self-Enforcing Agreements, note 16 supra, at 1683. The fact that State B is willing to enter an agreement
that conditions on non-verifiable factors does not necessarily signal that it is reciprocally fair. A selfish state could copy the signal, as
the invitation to reciprocate would induce greater efforts from State A and thus greater returns to the informed party. But the
preliminary agreement itself creates several opportunities to reciprocate in advance of the formalization of a long-term relationship
between the parties. First, a preliminary agreement gives State A the opportunity to acquire information about the character of State
B by observing its behavior in response to opportunities to reciprocate. Second, the preliminary agreement separates in time the
opportunity to reciprocate from the subsequent transaction that is ultimately contemplated. Id. The expenditure of time itself
communicates a valuable signal of a preference for reciprocity. See A. Michael Spence, Time and Communication in Economic
and Social Interaction, 87 Q. J. ECON. 651 (1973).
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carrying out an agreement that is only self-enforcing. Because reciprocally fair individuals can capture
the returns to general information about their type through an enhanced reputation for cooperation, they
are more willing to spend resources to provide this information. 55

We do not wish to overstate the efficacy of preliminary agreements. If the cost of exhibiting
cooperative behavior were less than the potential gains to be achieved subsequently from exploiting
counterparty reliance, parties rationally would discount the value of the signal. Our point is simply
that in some circumstances self enforcement can extend the scope of contractual space by
compensating for the deficiencies of third-party enforcement.

c. The direct and error costs of enforcement. The distinction between observable and verifiable
facts is key to understanding what motivates parties to choose between self-enforcement and thirdparty enforcement. Enforcement, as a conceptual matter, entails two categories of costs: (1) direct
costs, comprising (a) investments in detecting and verifying breach and in imposing sanctions, and b)
foregone opportunities from writing second best contracts that condition performance on less relevant
but verifiable factors; and (2) error costs, entailing losses in welfare derived from both failures to
recognize and sanction nonperformance (Type I errors) and incorrect determinations that breaches
have occurred (Type II errors). Parties should seek to minimize the sum of these costs given any
particular distribution of observable and verifiable facts relevant to the obligation to be enforced.

To illustrate how problems of private information influence the tradeoff between the direct costs
and the error costs of enforcement, assume that the elites acting on behalf of the states in our
hypothetical world behave as if they have the preferences for reciprocity revealed in laboratory
experiments. This assumption implies that self-enforcement will be effective in a wide range of
transactions not involving close-knit communities, or established on-going relationships. If reciprocal
fairness is a potent complement to these traditional means of self-enforcement, then it might extend to
“one-shot” investment agreements between states with no prior transactional history.

55
A reciprocally fair party will not only earn a portion of the enhanced surplus in this transaction, but, by revealing her type (the
bonus is paid), she will be able to develop a reputation for fairness that can be exploited at lower cost in future transactions. See
Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of Screening, Education and the Distribution of Income, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 283, 287 (1975).
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In any transaction in which self-enforcement is an available option, the direct costs of selfenforcement typically will be less than the direct costs of coercive enforcement. This is because selfenforcement only requires an actor to expend costs to observe the behavior of the counterparty, while
coercive enforcement requires the parties to expend additional resources in verifying that behavior
to a third party. 56 Moreover, where significant measures of performance are observable but not
verifiable, the direct costs of enforcement will include both the resources expended in verification as
well as the welfare losses from writing second best contracts. Self-enforcement, on the other hand,
permits parties to make credible promises regarding non-verifiable measures of performance, thus
increasing joint surplus.57 If direct enforcement costs were the only consideration, therefore, selfenforcement would generally be both cheaper and better than third-party enforcement.

But the advantages of self-enforcement are limited by two constraints. First, the further parties are
from environments in which reciprocity can be predicted to work, the greater the risk that a selfenforcing sanction will not be credible. Second, and perhaps more significant, self-enforcement
requires what we have termed “moral clarity.” Each party must be able to observe and properly
characterize instances of primary misbehavior or other nonperformance and distinguish them from
justifiable retaliatory responses to earlier instances of defection by the counterparty. 58 Accordingly,
declines in the moral clarity of breaches will generate higher error costs for self-enforcement relative
to external enforcement.

56

There are conditions under which the parties’ direct costs of self-enforcement may exceed that of coercive enforcement. This
would occur where the promisee has to expend resources in undertaking a punitive sanction for observable defection (say, a
proportionate retaliation or a refusal to deal) and where the imposition of a coercive sanction was subsidized by the state. Under these
conditions the cost of imposing a self-enforcing sanction may exceed the costs of verifying the breach to a third party.
57
Self-enforcing agreements may also help to solve a multi-tasking problem. Assume, for example, that State A’s performance
involves both verifiable and non-verifiable tasks. An agreement that was conditioned only on the verifiable tasks would be inefficient.
Linking verifiable performance measures to compensation will cause State A to substitute away from the non-verifiable tasks to the
compensated verifiable tasks, thus impairing overall performance. Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent
Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991) (Special Issue). Self-enforcing
agreements can avoid this problem by making any reward for cooperation dependant on the over-all performance of all tasks. Ernst
Fehr, Alexander Klein and Klaus M. Schmidt, Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness, Institute for Empirical Research
in Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper No. 72 (2001), at 26-29.
58
See John K. Setear, note 6 supra, at 666-75.
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Whenever the transactions are complex and the sequence of performances interrelated, moral
clarity dissipates. Either party can mistakenly label a justifiable retaliation as a defection and vice
versa. In these environments, third-party referees serve a valuable function by “calling fouls.” A
disinterested observer may be in a better position to sort out complex behavior and, by “blowing the
whistle,” can both empower the aggrieved party to respond in kind and forestall further retaliation by
the breacher. A constraint on this capacity, however, would be the presence of observable but
unverifiable factors. The third-party observer adds value only in cases where moral clarity dissipates
at a greater rate than does verifiability.

Any calculation of the costs of enforcement thus must balance the higher direct costs of coercive
enforcement against the potentially higher error costs of self-enforcement. Those error costs are
particularly salient in the cases of complex agreements between nations with no history nor a
necessary future. When expected error costs exceed the expected direct costs, the optimal enforcement
regime will opt for some form of coercive, third-party enforcement.

5.Complementarity and Rivalry in Enforcement Mechanisms

Finally, one must consider the possible interaction of multiple enforcement mechanisms on each
other. Three possibilities exist: The mechanisms may be independent, in that increasing one will have
no effect on the benefits derived from increasing the others; they may be rivalrous, in that increasing
one will decrease the returns from outlays on others; or they may be complements, in that increasing
one will increase the benefits from others at no additional cost.

It seems plausible that the three aspects of self-enforcing mechanisms (retaliatory threats based
on repeat transactions, reputation, and reciprocity) are complements. Even in particular cases where
the pull of retaliatory threats and reputation may be weak, such as with the emergence of new regimes,
states may learn to reciprocate because reciprocation pays off in many transactions over time.
Reciprocation may also induce a virtuous cycle, in which engaging in cooperative behavior increases
a regime’s preference for more cooperative behavior. Successful cooperation that generates a
reputation for trustworthiness or produces returns in ongoing transactions both furthers a regime’s self26

interest and causes parties to learn to care more about the other party’s payoff. This, in turn, may
strengthens a regime’s willingness to reciprocate voluntarily even where the prospect of retaliation
is quite low.59

Some experimental evidence regarding individuals does support this claim of complementarity. 60 Experiments have compared the effort levels of subjects who were given a single, anonymous
opportunity to respond to generous offers with the effort levels in a similar game in which repeated
interactions created the additional opportunity for retaliation. 61 The results are, that while a significant
fraction of individuals were motivated by reciprocity in the one-shot, anonymous transaction, repeated
interactions caused a significant increase in the effort level.

Theorists have not settled on a single explanation for why this complementarity exists between
reciprocity and retaliation, and these studies remain subject to the same reservations we expressed
above about the experiments that produced evidence of a preference for reciprocal fairness.62
Nonetheless, the evidence seems sufficient to justify speculation about what might drive the observed
complementarity. One conjecture notes that the properties of incentives created by repeated
interactions are similar to the properties of incentives created by invitations to reciprocate. Selfenforcing incentives are imposed implicitly and ex post. Thus, for example, in a repeat game, tit-for-tat
framework a cooperator can punish a defection ex post without risking offense to a potential
cooperator by announcing in advance a sanction for defection. 63
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See F. Van Dijk, J. Sonnemans, & F. van Winden, Social Ties in a Public Good Experiment, 85 J. PUBLIC ECON. 275
(2002).
60

Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity, supra note 32, at 6-7; Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter &
Georg Kirchsteiger, note 32 supra; Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter & Georg Kirchsteiger, Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in
Competitive Experimental Markets, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 1 (1998); Gary Charness, Responsibility and Effort in an Experimental
Labor Market, 42 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 375 (2000); Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete
Contract Market, 107 J. POL. ECON. 106 (1999); Simon Gächter & Armin Falk, Reputation or Reciprocity, Institute for Empirical
Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper No. 19 (1999).
61
Ults Martin Brown, Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, Incomplete Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions, Institute for
Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper No. 38 (2001).
62
See text at note 37 supra.
63
See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, note 16 supra, at 1681.
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By contrast, incentives based on coercive enforcement are explicit and ex ante.64 The difference
in their nature might make these incentives rivalrous with those that operate implicitly and ex post.
Experimental data indicate that, when offered a trust contract, a substantial number of individuals will
both pay higher prices and extend higher levels of effort than narrow self-interest would dictate. When
offered the same choices plus the possibility of obtaining a monetary sanction if the promisor shirks,
the average price offered by buyers and the average effort given by sellers was lower. Without
coercive enforcement, reciprocal fairness generates high levels of performance. But once the
interaction is backed by coercion, reciprocity declines and overall performance is reduced.65 These
experimental results suggest that self-enforcing motivations based on reciprocity and explicit, coercive
incentives may indeed be in conflict with each other. In particular, coercive enforcement may “crowd
out” behavior based on reciprocal fairness.66

Why might reciprocal fairness and repeated interactions complement each other while reciprocal
fairness functions as the rival of coercive enforcement? One conjecture focuses on the fact that
coercive third-party enforcement is structured as a zero sum game in which the promisee threatens ex
ante to sanction the promisor for subsequent nonperformance. The explicit, ex ante nature of coercive
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Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University
of Zurich, Working Paper No. 95, at 19-20 (2001).
65

There are two primary reasons why the amount of voluntary cooperation declined when the contract was enforceable
coercively. First, shirking by sellers increased. This was true even where the expected costs of shirking exceeded the expected returns
to the seller. Second, reciprocity either in the form of generous offers by buyers and/or reciprocating efforts by sellers vanished almost
completely. Where shirking was expected to payoff for the sellers, they chose the minimum effort in the vast majority of cases. In
addition, in those instances where buyers offered more generous prices above the minimum, sellers did not reciprocate with greater
efforts. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, note 56 supra, at 15-18.
There are other experiments that have reported similar effects from the introduction of coercive enforcement. See, e.g., Iris
Bohnet, Bruno Frey, & Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust and Crowding, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University (KSG Working Paper No. 00-009 (2000); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a
Price, 29 J. LEGALSTUD. 1 (2000); Ernst Fehr & Bruno Rockenbach, Incentives and Intentions – The Hidden Rewards of Economic
Incentives, University of Zurich (mimeo 2000). An extensive literature in social psychology also considers the crowding out of intrinsic
motivations. See, e.g., Edward L. Deci, R. Koestner, & Richard M. Ryan, A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining
the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation,125 PSYCH BULL. 627 (1999).
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Robert E. Scott, Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, note 16 supra, at 1689-91. The experimental research on crowding
out is still at a preliminary stage. Thus, we do not currently understand precisely why or when reciprocity and voluntary cooperation
will be undermined by coercive enforcement. There is some evidence, however, that framing effects influence the crowding out
phenomenon. For example, if the explicit incentive is framed as a bonus from a base offer rather than as a fine for nonperformance,
the levels of reciprocity are considerably greater. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary
Cooperation? (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. Of Zurich, Working Paper No. 34, 2002), at 26-30.
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sanctions may undermine the instinct to reciprocate. Fair types may regard the threat of coercive
enforcement as simply unfair, as they are willing to reciprocate voluntarily, while selfish types may
interpret the threat of sanction through third-party enforcement as a signal that the promisee is unlikely
to be a reciprocator.67 The same explicit threat does not exist in the case of repeated interactions
where the implicit sanction (terminating the relationship) is imposed ex post and only after defection
has been observed. In that sense, ex post punishment may be perceived as “fairer” than the ex ante
announcement of sanctions for breach of an obligation.

Another conjecture, derived from the apparent preference for fairness and studies of reputational
sanctions, proposes that group solidarity may reduce the free riding problem associated with
retaliatory enforcement of collective informal sanctions but play no role in formal coercive actions.
Parties may consider it fair to absorb some costs in the monitoring and sanctioning of others if they
regard this burden as borne generally. Assignment of a special role to a specific entity, however, may
undermine a sense of fairly shared collective responsibility. Establishing a person or process
responsible for enforcing an agreement may induce others to specialize away from enforcement.
Finally, the reputational benefits derived from being seen to cooperate may diminish if the audience
perceives the behavior as the product of coercion.

C. Summary

In this Part, we have argued that states design their bilateral and multilateral agreements to be
enforceable when they wish to make relation-specific investments that otherwise would not be made.
It is well-understood that self-enforceable agreements are an alternative to third-party, coercive
enforcement. Where self-enforcement is effective, it is more efficient than third-party enforcement
because it better responds to the effects of asymmetric information.

67
Another speculation that might explain crowding out is the perception that coercion is a “hostile” action. A coercive sanction
is always framed as a threat (“if you don’t perform, then I will invoke authority. . .”). To the extent that intentions matter in motivating
reciprocity, the ex ante threat may be interpreted as a hostile intention. A liquidated damages clause in a contract may thus be
perceived as an indication of distrust. If sellers perceive the damages clause as a hostile act they may be less willing to put forth the
same quality of efforts as compared to a situation in which the first mover sends a trusting signal. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, note
66 supra, at 14.
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Contract theorists traditionally have believed that self-enforcement is limited to contexts where
reputation or repeated interactions are sufficient to make promises credible. Recent work in
experimental economics suggests that reciprocal fairness is a potent supplement to the traditional
means of self-enforcement. 68 But this expansive view of the potential of self enforcement does not
mean that parties to international agreements have no need to create mechanisms that rely on thirdparty enforcement. Self-enforcing agreements have a common feature: The agreements are simple in
form, clear in commitment and are structured to create opportunities for parties to reciprocate in ways
that expand the contractual surplus.69 When inter-state investment depends on complex agreements
where performance is interactive, the high error costs of self-enforcement argue for mechanisms that
provide a means of verifying performance and nonperformance to a third-party referee.

The preceding analysis has sought to demonstrate that a contract theory approach to
international agreements between states offers a useful framework for both positive explanation and
normative critique. A particular feature of the framework we have developed focuses on what we will
call rational reciprocity. In the next part, we relax the restrictive assumptions of our informal model
in order to apply the insights of the rational-reciprocity approach in a more realistic setting.

II. THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

We observed above that self enforcement is a pervasive, but not exclusive, mechanism for giving
instrumental effect to international agreements. Here we examine this point in some detail. We explain
how international agreements invoke self enforcement, but we also rebut the claim that treaties do not
rely on other strategies to promote compliance. We explore three such alternatives: third-party

68

Whether reciprocal fairness is a learned behavior that derives from the benefits of cooperation in repeated interactions, or
instead is an intrinsic motivation, remains an open question. But the evidence suggests that the domain of self-enforcing agreements
extends to environments in which a reputation for trustworthiness and the discipline of ongoing relationships are relatively weak forces.
See Robert E. Scott, Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, note 16 supra, at 1674-75.
69
Where transactions are complex and the respective promises interrelated, a failure to perform a promise may not be obvious
and thus reciprocity may not serve to make the promises credible. Given the highly interactive nature of the respective obligations of
each party, it may be difficult to know, for example, whether one party’s refusal to respond cooperatively in a particular case
represents unfair or selfish behavior or an appropriately measured, retaliatory response to an earlier instance of non-cooperation by
the other. Robert E. Scott, note 28 supra, at 2050-51.
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arbitration of claims brought by nongovernmental actors; accepting the jurisdiction of a dispute
resolution body embedded in important institutional relationships; and authorizing independent
domestic courts to entertain claims based on an agreement. Each of these mechanisms possesses the
critical elements of coercive third-party enforcement: Persons affected by violations (and not just the
states who are parties to the agreement) may present their claim to a disinterested third party that has
the authority and capacity itself to impose substantial sanctions on the violator. Each may serve as a
substitute for, or a supplement to, self enforcement. We illustrate how the particular enforcement
strategies used by these agreements is broadly consistent with the rational-reciprocity approach.

A. Self Enforcement

A wide array of international arrangements induce cooperation without invoking external coercion
to induce compliance. Arms control agreements, joint ventures for the production of advanced military
technology, OECD recommendations on international competition policy, the Basel Accords on capital
adequacy standards for financial institutions and myriad other instruments and concordats constitute
a body of commitments that operate without regard to formal means of enforcement. 70 Other
agreements contain elaborate dispute resolution provisions but rely ultimately on self enforcement to
induce compliance. We examine in detail the mechanisms of self enforcement implicated by these
arrangements and explain why states agree to them, rather than other enforcement mechanisms.

1. Counterparty Retaliation in International Agreements

Observers have noted that “almost all nations observe all principles of international law and
almost all of their obligations almost all of the time,” but a comprehensive explanation of this

70
Our examples in text include both agreements that the parties intend to have “legal force” but invoke no third-party coercive
enforcement mechanism, and “soft law” that by its own terms creates no legal obligation. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner,
note 8 supra (surveying the field of soft law and providing a positive theory for choice of no formal enforcement). Goldsmith and
Posner focus on the decision whether to invoke a sense of legal obligation under international law. We, in by contrast, examine specific
enforcement mechanisms, and in particular self enforcement. We observe that the practice of states tends to relegate both soft law
and a wide array of formal treaty commitments to self enforcement, although some mechanisms of self enforcement (such as WTO
dispute resolution) entail a higher degree of formality than do others.
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phenomenon remains elusive.71 In a wide range of instances, compliance occurs without the operation
of any formal third-party enforcement mechanism. Before we consider what third-party enforcement
does, we must have some understanding of how self-enforcing agreements work in the context of
international commitments.

To draw on contract theory to understand international bargaining, we must specify how state-tostate negotiations resemble private contracting. In the case of private contracts, theory starts with the
assumption that contractors seek to maximize their joint welfare. In the case of states, we have to
specify more carefully who the contractors are and under what institutional constraints they operate.

First, we relax the assumption made in the previous part that governing elites seek to maximize
national welfare. Taking our lead from rational choice theory in international relations, we instead
will assume that each state has a political elite that seek to maximize its own welfare and faces
uncertainty about the future.72 Importantly, however, we suppose that the institutional constraints on
the ability of political elites to pursue self-interested goals varies according to the characteristics of
the domestic regime.73 States ruled by dictatorships or other authoritarian regimes, for example,
constrain the leaders only in the sense that some choices might lead to an unacceptably high risk of
domestic or foreign overthrow. Constitutional democracies with separation of powers, in contrast,
constrain the political elite both through mandated power-sharing and check-and-balances
arrangements and by posing a risk of electoral defeat.

The recognition that political elites are agents who pursue their own self-interest necessarily
raises the question of whether rent-seeking may distort their behavior. In Part I we assumed that
political elites acted to maximize the joint welfare from their international commitments. But in this
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Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave 47 (1979). Cf. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM.
J. INT’L L. 705 (1988):
The surprising thing about international law is that nations ever obey its strictures or carry out its mandates. This observation
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See Stephen D. Krasner, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 7, 43-44 (1999).
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Cf. Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988)
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more realistic framework, the accuracy of that assumption may be challenged. If elites cannot be
controlled by their citizens whose interests they represent, then they may be maximizing their own
welfare at the expense of social welfare. No one doubts that political elites act in ways that are
inconsistent with the collective interests of their citizens. Nevertheless, we will assume that elites do
select enforcement mechanisms that are designed to maximize the surplus from their international
commitments. After all, political elites seek rents either by diverting wealth to themselves or to the
interests groups they represent. In any case, elites have no interest in degrading the quality of their
international agreements; these agreements create the wealth they may then attempt to divert. 74

We focus on elites and regimes, rather than states, to capture an important phenomenon in
international relations: Regime changes occur and with them both the internally known preferences
and the externally manifested characteristics of the political elite.75 In form, international agreements
bind states, but more realistically they bind political elites. A regime change may alter the elite’s
preferences, and thus its susceptibility to retaliatory threats.

Furthermore, we assume that reputations attach to regimes more than to states. A change in regime
thus can dissipate the reputational effects of a prior elite’s behavior. Without this assumption, one
would have to assume that reputational effects are pervasive and strong in almost all international
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agreements, as states-qua-states demonstrate considerable durability. 76 In a world of semi-permanent
states, almost all states would have to anticipate future interactions with other states, even for those
states not engaged in extensive repeat transactions with other states. Turnover of regimes explains why
anything more than reputation-based sanctions by the “international community” is needed to enhance
the credibility of promises made through international agreements.

For purposes of our analysis, we will not seek to define either elite or regime too tightly, and
instead will rely on soft sociological intuitions about these concepts. On the one hand, a political elite
can remain stable even as it undergoes gradual evolutionary change. On the other hand, a state can
exhibit continuity in its type of government but experience regime change. Consider, for example, an
authoritarian state where one ruling clique ousts another, in the process purging the political and
technocratic leadership. The new clique, we assume, has some capacity to disavow the actions of its
predecessors and thus avoid at least some of the benefits and burdens of its predecessor’s reputation,
even though the form of government remains the same. Conversely, a stable political system can
change its leaders without altering either its regime or the governing elite. Thus we assume that the
normal replacement of one political party by another in a democratic parliament or executive does not
dissipate a state’s reputation regarding international relations, any more than, historically, changes in
the identity of the Party General Secretary in and of themselves affected the Soviet Union’s core
preferences or reputation. 77

Once one considers these distinguishing attributes of states, it seems evident that the threat of future
retaliation can induce parties to an international agreement to honor their obligations. As the rationalreciprocity approach predicts, many international pacts do involve mutual commitments to forego
actions that would benefit the promisor and harm the promisee, such as increasing armaments or
raising tariffs. Where the benefits and costs foregone are sufficiently symmetrical between the parties
and project reliably into the future, a promisee can credibly threaten to punish a defaulting promisor
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by claiming the benefits and inflicting the costs that the agreement otherwise precludes. In a bilateral
arms treaty, such as the several nuclear arms agreements between the Soviet Union and the United
States, each party had an incentive to adhere to its obligations to the extent that the other party had the
capacity to respond to breaches by augmenting its arms beyond the treaty limits.78
The efficacy of retaliatory threats in these agreements depends on two factors – the ease of
detection of defections from the agreement and the ability of the parties to make credible and
symmetrical retaliatory threats. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, for example, did not specify any
observable, much less verifiable, conditions short of armed invasion that would constitute a breach,
and thus pushed back defection to the point where retaliation would be indistinguishable from the selfpreserving actions that would occur in the absence of any agreement.79 Moreover, exogenous changes
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– Germany’s easy conquest of Western Europe and the consequent removal of an immediate military
threat to its west – led Hitler to devalue the benefits of avoiding an armed conflict with the Soviet
Union. In other words, as of the spring of 1941 the cost of Soviet retaliation no longer seemed
sufficient to induce German compliance with its obligations under the Pact. The Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact thus illustrates an international agreement with extremely weak self-enforcement. Put differently,
the Pact in retrospect exhibited great vulnerability to end-game problems.

The events that resulted from the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact suggest another point. One should not
confuse self-enforcement based on reciprocal threats of retaliation with unilateral imposition based
on coercion. A state that surrenders to superior force is not behaving cooperatively, but rather
demonstrating a preference for survival or a distaste for discomfort. 80 Coercion signals no reliable
information about either the durability of coercing party’s preferences or the credibility of the coerced
party’s promises, except that it suggests an inability to cooperate reciprocally on the part of both. If
one interprets the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact not as a mutual commitment to refrain from aggression,
but rather as a unilateral obligation by the Soviet Union not to take precautions against Germany, then
the Pact teaches very little about self-enforcement. Similarly, we would not regard Czechoslovakia’s
acceptance of its absorption into Germany through the Anschluss as reflecting compliance with an
international agreement, because only in a formal and meaningless sense of the word did Czechoslovakia “agree” to become part of Germany. 81

Trade agreements offer another example of self enforcement through retaliatory threats. A state that
lowers its tariffs or otherwise reduces trade barriers gives up potential revenue and diminishes
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protection desired by its producers to the benefit of exporting producers based in other states. If one
party defects, the other may respond symmetrically. As long as each party has a domestic market that
other parties covet, its threat to protect its market will encourage others not to protect theirs. By “a
market,” of course, we mean not just the immediate trade balance, but the discounted value of a series
of anticipated future interactions.82

Yet another illustration of the function of retaliatory threats in international agreements involves
sovereign indebtedness. Throughout history and manifestly today, sovereigns manage to acquire
significant assets based only on their promise to repay the debt, in spite of the capacity of many
unilaterally to repudiate their debts or to degrade them through currency manipulation. 83 What most
powerfully explains the willingness of lenders to treat these promises as credible is a conviction that
governments will seek private financing of public debt into the indefinite future. Thus, although
government default seems about as frequent an occurrence as private failures to honor debts, typically
lenders and states negotiate rescheduling rather than invoke the coercive powers of third parties. The
defaulting state pays a penalty in terms of high interest rates rather than by absorbing a lump-sum
sanction. The exception to this pattern reinforces the point: Revolutionary regimes often declare a
break with the past, repudiate past obligations and initially pursue a policy of financial autarky. Over
time, these regimes seek to return to the capital markets, and when they do so belatedly negotiate
settlements of their predecessors’ obligations.

Credible and reciprocal threats of direct retaliation explain much of the enforceability of
international agreements. First, a large portion of extant international agreements are bilateral, and thus
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identify precisely the persons who have an interest in inducing enforcement. Bilateral agreements also
are the type of accord most likely to produce substantial internalization of the agreement’s benefits by
the parties. Second, many agreements seek to augment welfare through a mutual exchange of
concessions. Where the expectations underlying the agreement are realized, withdrawing the
concession would harm the other party.

At the same time, the prospect of party retaliation is insufficient to maximize the value of all
international agreements. First, a significant fraction of agreements are multilateral, sometimes
extensively so, leading to a free rider problem. If retaliation is costly and the benefits of adherence
are shared by a large number of parties, no one party may have a sufficient incentive to bear the burden
of retaliation. Knowledge of this fact diminishes the threat value of retaliation. 84 Second, some
agreements generate benefits to persons besides the parties. We should not expect any party to absorb
costs to protect those externalized benefits. And third, all agreements remain vulnerable to the endgame problem. As state preferences change, due either to exogenous events or a transformation of a
political elite, one or more parties may have less to lose from retaliation and thus become prone to
defection. Understanding this, all parties may underinvest in compliance.85 To the extent we
nonetheless observe some enforcement of such agreements, we need to consider complementary selfenforcing mechanisms.

2. Reputation in International Agreements

Reputation is an additional mechanism for self-enforcing international agreements. As we
observed in Part I, there exists extensive documentation of the effectiveness of community-based
sanctions as a means of inducing the compliance of individuals with an obligation. 86 This dynamic
applies to states as well.87 A reputation for honoring commitments benefits a state by increasing the
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possibilities of future beneficial cooperation. Monitoring compliance need not be costly (although the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact provides a counterexample), and information about compliance, if
verifiable, may be easy to share among states. The set of potential future parties presumably is larger
than the set of present parties to any particular international agreement, so more states have an
incentive both to acquire information about the behavior of other states and to generate a positive
reputation for international probity.

In some instances reputational incentives can provide a better explanation for compliance with
international commitments than does reciprocal retaliation. A state facing an end-game problem in one
agreement must understand that its behavior will affect its future prospects for international
cooperation through other agreements. Thus, even if it wishes to dispose of its current relationship
opportunistically, it must consider how such opportunism will affect its future prospects. Moreover,
all potential states can make reputation-based responses to a state’s behavior, not just those with
which a state currently enjoys formal treaty relations. A concern for its reputation thus will induce a
state to cooperate even in cases where it is indifferent to retaliation by its counterparty.

Reputation, however, is not a complete explanation of international behavior. One complication
derives from our observation above that reputations attach to regimes rather than to states. Because
reputation has value only to the extent it has an impact on a state’s future prospects, one must introduce
a discount factor to reflect the present significance of those prospects. It seems reasonable to assume,
however, that discount factors vary among regimes. A state which has a stable history and no
significant internal or external threat should have a regime that values future prospects nearly as much
as present ones. The ruling elite in a state undergoing radical transformation with an uncertain
outcome, in contrast, should devalue all future payoffs, including both the benefits and harms
associated with its reputation. To take an example from recent events, the reputational effects to the
United States and the United Kingdom regarding their obligations under the United Nations Charter
with respect to the invasion of Iraq are likely to be long-lasting, while the effects on the soon-to-depart
Baathist regime probably were less significant. More generally, disputes between foreign investors

Law, 31 J. LEG. STUD. S95 (2002); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, note 8 supra, at 136-37.
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and host countries tend to arise mostly after a regime change, whether the product of a violent
revolution (as in America in 1783 and Russian in 1917) or due to more ordinary domestic turmoil.88

A second problem results from the difficulty of specifying the elements of a regime’s reputation
for compliance with its international obligations. Andrew Guzman, in the course of an extensive
analysis of the role of reputation in explaining compliance, suggests that a state’s reputation may be
both compartmentalized and dependent on the character of the international obligation at issue. He
hypothesizes, for example, that violations of an arms control treaty may not affect how others perceive
a state’s propensity to honor trade agreements, and that dishonoring “soft law” obligations may count
for less than transgressing a commitment that is explicitly legally binding. 89

We agree with Guzman that a state’s reputation for complying with international obligations, and
hence the role of reputation as a self-enforcement mechanism, may not be monolithic or linear. We are
skeptical, however, about his particular conjectures. He comes close to arguing that reputational
effects vary precisely with the scope and content of the specific international obligation at issue. This
collapses the question of the reputational effects and formal international law doctrine in a way that
assumes that international law experts are the only relevant audience. We suspect that reputations can
vary in ways that do not coincide with formal compliance with international law obligations. To take
a concrete example, the effect on Japan’s reputation due to its treatment of its prisoners during World
War II depended not at all on the fact that Japan had not joined the 1929 Geneva Convention. 90

This exposes a third complexity. If reputations are messy and the impact of particular actions on
them are unclear, then the significance of reputation as a constraint on behavior comes into question.
Once one disposes of the extremes of outlaw recklessness and obsessive punctiliousness, more finely
grained assessments of reputation become problematic. What should one make, for example, of the
decision of the United States in 1985 to withdraw its submission to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
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International Court of Justice? One prominent scholar described this as a “wanton act,” although the
United States had scrupulously complied with its obligations regarding the Court’s jurisdiction. 91 Did
the United States encounter greater costs in its international negotiations after that date? The growth
of its multilateral activity afterwards, and particularly the building of the coalition that fought the first
Gulf War, suggests not.

A device that can clarify the connection between action and reputation is a third-party dispute
resolution system. 92 The GATT and its successor, the WTO, provide important instances of an
international agreement specifying a self-contained process to declare compliance and violations.
Only parties to the agreement (that is to say, states) can invoke the process, and the dispute settlement
body has no coercive powers beyond a capacity to declare whether actions do or do not comply with
the agreement.93 The agreement thus uses dispute settlement to generate specific information about
compliance without expending resources to coerce behavior.94

But even self-contained dispute resolution has its limits. First, the quality of the information about
members rests largely on the dispute resolution body’s reputation for accurate and disinterested
assessments. It seems unrealistic to take the latter for granted. Second, we doubt that observers
systematically separate information based upon dispute settlement determinations from information
about how states respond to compliance determinations. Evidence of indifference to the resolution of
a dispute, as manifested both by a failure of noncompliers to alter their behavior and the absence of
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significant retaliation, would undermine the reputational impact of those determinations.95 Third, as
discussed above, not all issues of importance to contracting states are verifiable at an acceptable cost.
As to nonverifiable issues, any pronouncements the dispute settlement system might make would be
meaningless.

As with retaliatory threats, then, reputation provides an important but incomplete explanation of
successful self-enforcement of international agreements. In particular, it does not provide a
satisfactory account of the behavior of either new or soon-to-depart regimes or of the transitivity of
reputation across international agreements. These lacunae might suggest that self-enforcement has
serious limits as a positive theory to explain compliance with international agreements. There remains
to be considered, however, whether states may have a preference for compliance that is independent
of retaliatory threats and reputation. We now turn to that question.

3. Reciprocal Fairness as a State Preference

We noted above that laboratory studies provide substantial evidence of the existence of a
preference for reciprocal fairness on the part of many, but by no means all, individuals. To what extent
does a preference for reciprocal fairness extend to states? We argue that the individual characteristics
identified by the laboratory studies may also extend to regime preference formation. Our argument
rests on both inferences about regimes and some casual empiricism.

At the most fundamental level, regimes comprise individuals, and it is not wholly implausible to
believe that those people who shape a regime’s preferences have something in common with the
persons studied in the laboratory experiments. We suspect, however, that the representativeness
problem that underlies all experimental data may have special salience when the group of interest –
elite decisionmakers responsible for conducting foreign policy – is atypical of the general population.
We therefore do not insist on the relevance of the experimental data, other than as suggesting a line
of investigation.
95
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It may be that elites must take into account a widely held preference in the general population for
reciprocal fairness, even if elite members do not share this preference, due to democratic constraints
on elite conduct. We doubt this argument has much purchase, however. First, a significant number of
regimes face reduced or nonexistent democratic constraints. Some have no democratic elections;
others, such as the members of the European Union, delegate significant discretion regarding
international relations to supranational institutions. Second, we suspect that national foreign policy
elites will have considerable capacity to mediate accounts of their international behavior with national
electorates. Depictions of reciprocal fairness to some extent may substitute for actual conduct.

Notwithstanding these qualifications, there are still good reasons to believe that many regimes
exhibit a preference for reciprocal fairness. First, states typically carry out international relations
through bureaucracies. Ministries of foreign affairs, trade and the armed forces shape policy in the
overwhelming majority of states. It seems plausible that these bureaucracies might display the
tendency generally observed in such structures, namely, ceteris paribus, maximization of discretionary
authority.96 And exhibiting reciprocal fairness seems a good strategy for optimizing interactions with
counterpart bureaucracies, which in turn should maximize each bureaucracy’s power vis-à-vis its
political masters.

A response to this conjecture might be that tension rather than cooperation may optimize
bureaucratic power. Military bureaucracies in particular might increase their authority by minimizing
interactions with their counterparts as part of a broader strategy of stoking tensions and feeding
insecurity. One strand of late twentieth century thought, for example, maintained that a U.S. national
security complex fattened its budgets and expanded its influence by contriving a permanent sense of
crisis.97
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On balance, however, this response seems far fetched. By and large, uncooperative behavior that
fuels international tension creates disproportionately great risks for foreign policy elites. A crisis
brings their performance under more scrutiny than usual, may set in motion dangerous events with
consequences beyond the elite’s control, and otherwise unsettles the stable rationality that
bureaucracies generally seek. We suspect that the link between conventional bureaucratic incentives
and reciprocal fairness is strong, although by no means absolute.

Anecdotal evidence that even military bureaucracies exhibit some preference for reciprocal
fairness includes the existence of confidence-building measures to which states commit themselves.
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe exemplifies such arrangements.98 One might
think that professional military organizations would oppose an agreement that constrains weapons
deployments and the size of deployed forces. But the Treaty has substantial reporting and inspection
requirements and rests on confidence-building measures such as embedded observers that earlier
agreements had promoted.99 These techniques engage military personnel in a range of cooperative
behaviors with their counterparts, interactions that those involved seem to find desirable.

A further suggestion of preferences for reciprocal fairness among many states can be inferred from
the growth in number, scale and scope of international organizations devoted to facilitating
cooperative behavior. Growth may reflect many factors, of course, but it seems reasonable to
associate an organization’s reputation, which accumulates over time, with increased attractiveness to
regimes already disposed to reciprocal fairness. To cite some important but by no means exclusive
examples of growth, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank had 29 members in 1946,
173 in 1992, and 184 in 2003; the GATT had 23 founding members in 1947, 102 in 1979, and its
successor, the WTO, had 146 in 2003; the European Communities had 6 founding members in 1957,
grew to 15 in 1994 and 25 in 2004. Each of these institutions also evolved from a specific-purpose
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entity (postwar reconstruction, currency stability, tariff reduction) to a much broader governance
institution. We are prepared to believe that these organizations may stand for less than they seem. 100
But even discounting for the gap between the ambitions and the accomplishments of these
organizations, their proliferation suggests that an increasing number of regimes prefer the kind of
reciprocal and cooperative relations that membership in the organizations promotes.

4. Self-Enforcing International Agreements and Contract Theory

As we observed above, self enforcement is the norm in international agreements, not the exception.
Before exploring departures from this norm, we consider whether the patterns in self-enforcing
international agreements conform to the predictions of the rational-reciprocity approach. Many of
these agreements involve fairly simple and clear commitments, either as stated or as a result of the
dispute resolution process contained in the agreement. At least as importantly, they typically implicate
observable but unverifiable conditions, such as perceptions of national security or “serious injury”
to economic interests. Moreover, many agreements provide the parties with ongoing opportunities to
signal a preference for reciprocity.

Consider first the broad class of arms control agreements. By forgoing technologically feasible
procurement in instances where research, development and deployment take time, a party to these
agreements exposes itself to the risk of opportunistic behavior by others. Increasing the credibility of
a promise not to acquire a weapons system clearly would enhance the promisor’s expected return. At
the same time, each promise carries an implicit reservation, namely that its adherence will not come
at the price of destruction of the regime. The modern trend in these agreements has been toward
increasingly elaborate inspection and verification, sometimes carried out by independent monitors,
as in the case of the (ultimately unsuccessful) UN arms inspectors in Iraq between 1991 and 2003 and
the various interventions of the International Atomic Energy Commission from Chernobyl in 1986 to
Iran in 2004. Thus, although no arms control agreement of which we are aware employs formal, quasi-
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judicial third-party coercive enforcement, they do provide some space for noncoercive third-party
dispute resolution. 101

We believe the reasons why arms control regimes rely solely on self enforcement are reasonably
clear and are consistent with contract theory. Parties have an incentive to make their commitments to
arms control credible so as to induce reliance in others, but also require sufficient flexibility to
abandon their commitments when grave security interests arise. To a greater extent than other kinds
of international agreements, the subject of arms control involves regime security. Moreover, regimes
plausibly do not regard the question of whether any state of affairs threatens its security as verifiable.
Rather, regimes should regard the calculus as to what constitutes an unacceptable threat to their
survival as uniquely nondelegable. At the same time, regime security seems reasonably observable.
As a result, we should expect regimes to strive to enhance clarity and augment opportunities for
reciprocal action. Observers report that this is the case.102

A much studied example of a self-enforcing international agreement is the Uruguay Round
Agreements and the World Trade Organization that administers them. 103 Like arms control agreements,
enhancing the credibility of the respective promises augments the value of trade commitments. Also
like arms control agreements, these agreements implicate fundamental issues of regime security,
although of an economic rather than a military nature. Finally, and to a much greater extent than in arms
control, the formalization and elaboration of noncoercive third-party dispute resolution has grown
over time. The early GATT, ancestor of the Uruguay Round Agreements, contained no formal
procedure as such, although one based on arbitration buttressed by self enforcement evolved to meet
the needs of the parties. A 1979 Understanding formalized these customary practices.104 The 1994
version involves greater institutional development, including the creation of a standing appellate body
and strengthening of the statement of obligation associated with its determinations. But, as noted
above, the WTO retains the fundamental structure of self enforcement. Only states who are parties to
101
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and

Surveillance, reprinted at

the Uruguay Round Agreements can invoke the dispute resolution process, and they may raise only
their own economic injuries. The dispute resolution process informs the complainant what levels of
retaliation would be proper under those agreements, but does not itself impose any sanctions.
Violations result in party retaliation and reputation effects, and not third-party coercion. 105

The link between moral clarity and self-enforcement seems evident in the case of WTO dispute
settlement. One particular trend is noteworthy. During the initial phase of the GATT system, from its
1947 creation until the 1979 changes embodied in the Tokyo Round Agreements, the obligations
largely dealt with tariff reduction and comparable straightforward and determinable commitments.
Observers documented high compliance and relatively infrequent resort to formal dispute resolution.
Beginning with the Tokyo Round, and particularly with the 1994 Uruguay Round, the agreements
extended to considerably more complex and interdependent commitments, especially reduction in
nontariff trade barriers such as health and safety regulation. As the nature of the obligations have lost
their clarity, reported violations have increased, arguably at a greater rate than under the old GATT,
and we have seen a higher incidence of formal dispute resolution, more frequent refusal to end
practices found to be inconsistent with WTO obligations, and greater criticism of the process by trade
experts.106

We offer these examples as representative of the kinds of self enforcement that pervades the field
of international agreements. Further examples would not add much to an appreciation of the predictive
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value of the rational-reciprocity approach. There may well be instances where self enforcing
international agreements lack clarity or rest on verifiable criteria, but these also tend to be cases
where the importance of investments and the corresponding need to enhance promisor credibility is
slight. 107 A real test of the relevance of the contract theory approach must come from a study of
international agreements that go beyond self enforcement and incorporate some form of third-party
coercion. We now turn to this inquiry.

B. Coercive Third-Party Enforcement

With respect to private parties, coercive third-party enforcement entails the state (or some
comparable higher authority) threatening sanctions against defaulters. As to international agreements,
third-party coercion seems problematic because there are no international entities capable of carrying
out threats against those who dishonor the precepts of international law. As we will show, however,
some enforcement mechanisms associated with international agreements do correspond to those
underlying private contracts.

1. The Elements of International Coercion

Coercive third-party enforcement of international agreements has three critical elements. First,
affected private parties, and not just states that sign an agreement, have the right to pursue violations.
Second, a disinterested third party has the jurisdiction to consider the claim. Third, the third party has
the authority and capacity to impose directly substantial sanctions on a violating state.108
107
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We recognize that isolating these characteristics as internationally coercive implies a commitment
to a particular theory of regime motivation. We will not unpack all of the implications of this
commitment here, but we note several salient points. First, extending to private parties the capacity
to invoke a tribunal’s jurisdiction solves an agency problem that otherwise might lead to underutilization of the forum. A person affected by regime action (perhaps an investor injured by a regulatory
decision of the host state) has a direct interest in obtaining redress. The regime administering the
injured person’s state might act on his behalf, but it also will take into account other aspects of its
relationship with the injuring regime and may fail to prosecute the claim because of extraneous
considerations.109 Private party standing thus increases the likelihood that a tribunal will act against
the interests of a regime bound by an international agreement. 110

Second, when it comes to tribunals, disinterested does not necessarily mean independent.
International agreements sometimes constitute tribunals in a manner that forces them to compete for
business and therefore provides incentives for reaching outcomes that the disputants will regard as
desirable. Such bodies differ from permanent tribunals that have mandatory jurisdiction over a set of
disputes that can be resolved in ways that reflect the normative preferences of the tribunal members.111
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Disinterestedness requires only that the decisionmakers will not allow extraneous considerations such
as bribes or threats to influence their decision once they acquire jurisdiction over a dispute.

Third, we assume that direct sanctions imposed by a tribunal have greater salience than the
reputational costs that an adjudicatory body can inflict simply by declaring one side in the wrong. We
recognize that regimes might balance reputational and financial interests differently than would a
private person, and in particular might respond to monetary sanctions in a more complex fashion. 112
But the power to apply these sanctions nevertheless implies an independent capacity to affect the
behavior of parties to a dispute and augments the reputational effects of a tribunal’s decision by
reinforcing its consequential significance.

A wide range of international agreements specify a third-party dispute resolution mechanism, but
not many of these meet our definition of coercive.113 Even the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, a zenith of
international cynicism and futility masked as law, contained an arbitration clause. GATT and WTO
dispute resolution in particular has evolved into a formalized, institutionally well developed and
academically well studied system. As we have observed, however, what lies behind all these treatybased dispute resolution mechanisms is a dynamic of state self-enforcement. 114 Under these
agreements, only states may seek dispute resolution, and the entity designated by the agreements as the
dispute resolver – the WTO dispute resolution body in the case of the WTO, the International Court
of Justice in the case of other instruments, or ad hoc arbitration as in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact –
has only the authority to declare the legal rights and obligations of the parties, and not to impose any
sanctions. None of these dispute settlement mechanisms, however formalized, employs coercion as
a means of inducing compliance.
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See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000).
113
For a survey of the practice that does not distinguish between coercive and noncoercive third-party adjudication, see Eric A.
Posner & John. C. Yoo, note 92 supra.
114
Some might argue that the WTO dispute resolution process in particular presents a complex case, because WTO adjudicators
have the capacity to authorize retaliatory actions by aggrieved states against countries that violate various Uruguay Round Agreements.
But the WTO does nothing more that provide an opinion as to what retaliation would conform to its understanding of international law:
The decision to retaliate remains that of the aggrieved state. At bottom, then, even sanctions generated by the WTO are reputational
rather than direct and substantial. See authorities cited in note 15 supra.
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But an increasing number of international agreements do invoke coercive sanctions through binding
arbitration. Some involve ad hoc dispute resolution rather than permanent international tribunals; some
do use such tribunals; and some employ independent domestic courts and enforcers. We discuss each
below.

2. Agreements to Arbitrate

Unlike the traditional dispute resolution mechanism, this arbitration occurs at the invocation of
private persons and can result in binding financial awards that a defaulting state must pay more or less
automatically. Giving private persons the right to pursue a claim increases the strength of a promise
and solves the agency cost problem that otherwise results because states do not have the same
incentives to protect investment-exporting citizens as do the investors themselves. Accordingly,
recognition of private standing strengthens the value of the host country’s commitment to protect
investor rights by increasing the expected cost of sanctions. The ultimate enforceability of an arbitral
award through international attachment, as well as the existence of reliable mechanisms in some
countries (such as the United States) for independent judicial enforcement, makes the outcome of these
arbitrations material and direct. 115

Historically, arbitration tribunals represented a post hoc response to a dispute. Once a controversy
arose, the countries involved agreed to let injured persons submit their claims and provided some
mechanism for domestic enforcement of the tribunal’s decisions. An especially powerful example of
this mechanism is the United States-Iran Claims Tribunal. This body, still at work more than two
decades after its creation as a mechanism for resolving a hostage standoff between the two countries,
exercises its authority to dispense awards out of a fund created from Iranian assets located in the
United States. The existence of the several billions of dollars of Iranian property under U.S. control,
as much as the formal agreement establishing the tribunal, explains that body’s successful record as
an arbiter of claims by U.S. and Iranian persons.116
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For a brief discussion of the role of damages in investment treaties, see Andrew T. Guzman, note 8 supra, at 45-47. Guzman
does not investigate damages as an enforcement mechanism under either European supranational law or through domestic courts.
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For the background of the tribunal’s creation, see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). For a review of its
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Since World War II, and particularly in the last two decades, capital-exporting states have entered
into agreements that provide ex ante for coercive enforcement of disputes over the treatment of foreign
investors. The details of these investor protection agreements vary, and our knowledge of practice
under them is incomplete because of a (now waning) tradition of treating both the agreements and
outcomes as confidential. In general, however, a host country commits in advance to resolve disputes
stemming from a private investment through third-party arbitration, either invoking ICSID auspices
or through some other institution. The investor can invoke the procedure without seeking any
government’s permission, and can translate their victories into monetary payment through the normal
judicial process, which at least in some countries operates independently of the government. 117

Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is an especially powerful
example of ex ante creation of a coercive third-party mechanism for resolving investment disputes.118
Its provisions codify certain substantive protections for investors and authorize complainants to invoke
the auspices of third-party arbitration against the three state parties. To date aggrieved investors have
brought 33 claims against Canada, Mexico and the United States.119 In each case, the World Bank’s
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) established a panel of arbiters
empowered to issue a monetary award. Prevailing claimants enforce their awards through the normal
judgment collection procedures available in national courts.120

practice, see THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESTITUTION (David D. Caron
& John R. Crook eds. 2000); Charles N. Brower & Jason D. Brueschke, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1998).
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North American Integration, 23 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 303 (2000); Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes
under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRASNAT’L L. 43 (2001); Todd Weiler, NAFTA Article 1105 and the
Principles of International Economic Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 35 (2003).
119
As of November 15, 2003, 9 claimants have initiated arbitration against Canada, 14 against Mexico, and 10 against the United
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For further discussion, see Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference,
43 VA . J. INT’L L. 675 (2003); Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA
Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (2003); Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter,
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37 (2003); Paul B. Stephan, Redistributive Litigation – Judicial Innovation, Private Expectations
and the Shadow of International Law, 88 VA L. REV. 789 (2002).
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NAFTA also contains another, less typical instance of coercive third-party arbitration of an
international agreement. Its Chapter 19 allows private persons to challenge government decisions to
impose antidumping and countervailing duties. Special arbitration panels substitute for the judicial
review of administrative decisionmaking that normally would take place. These panels do not have
the authority to impose coercive measures against a state, but each of the NAFTA parties has enacted
a domestic law making the government’s collection of antidumping and countervailing duties
contingent on its successful conclusion of the Chapter 19 process.121

One might argue that the types of arbitration arrangements we describe here are not substantially
different from the state-to-state dispute settlement procedures exemplified by the WTO system. In
either case, a state might refuse to honor its obligations. In the instance of WTO dispute resolution,
a state might not bring itself into conformity with what the WTO dispute settlement body specifies as
its obligations, taking its chances with retaliation by other WTO members. In the case of arbitration,
a state might not honor an award, either by directing a court to disregard the arbitral outcome or by
enacting a law that blocks payment. This argument, however, assumes that inducing a court to set aside
an arbitral award or the legislature to block payment entails only insignificant costs. As to
authoritarian regimes operating without effective separation of powers, the assumption may be valid.
But for many states, especially those in the rich world, judicial and parliamentary independence are
relatively stable and robust features of the domestic government. For regimes managing the foreign
policy of these states, a refusal to honor a third-party arbitral award entails domestic as well as
external costs. From the perspective of such a regime, the decision of a third-party arbiter may
function essentially the same as a command of a domestic court.

Why do states enter into these commitments? The rational-reciprocity approach provides an
explanation. First, these agreements have at their core complex, relation-specific investments, where
the welfare gains from making credible promises are significant. Absent protection from host
government overreaching, investors either will make lesser investments or demand greater
compensation from their hosts. Second, the commitments contained in these agreements refer to
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See Curtis A. Bradley, note 17 supra, at 1773-75.
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conditions that are likely to be verifiable and they do not contain implicit reservations resting on
nonverifiable conditions. The events that constitute compensable violations of investment protection
agreements involve public acts with reasonably determinable economic consequences. And allowing
foreign investors to develop an oil field or build a pipeline is much less likely to threaten a regime’s
security than is losing an arms race or allowing imports to destroy an entrenched local industry. Third,
the persons to whom the host state’s promises are directed – foreign investors – have an intense and
focused interest in having the obligation honored, while their home state, which in form is the
promisee, may have a more complicated set of incentives and might sell out the investors in pursuit
of some other objective. Coercive enforcement at the behest of the investors, without mediation by the
home state, thus solves an agency cost problem. Finally, the prospect of externally coerced
compensation responds to the change-of-regime end-game problem that historically has undermined
self-enforcing commitments to foreign investors.122

3. International Tribunals and Embedded Dispute Resolution

In terms of substantive obligation, the basic economic commitments that make up the Treaty of
Rome, the constitutional basis of the European Community, and the norms embraced in the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which extends to the
European Community members and twenty of their neighbors, do not differ greatly from those
contained in more broadly based multilateral agreements such as the Uruguay Round Agreements and
the various UN human rights conventions.123 Unlike the nearly universal multilateral regimes, however,
the two European agreements each establishes an independent court with the authority to hear
complaints brought by private persons and to levy fines on states that default on their commitments.
Why have the Europeans departed from the self-enforcing mechanisms used elsewhere?
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The existence of this enforcement mechanism suggests it provides some value, but not necessarily that, standing alone, it is
optimal. For evidence that domestic judicial enforcement of claims against the state has a salient, and perhaps greater, role in
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We believe the answer involves the particularly embedded nature of the courts within the
European commitments to elimination of trade barriers and the protection of fundamental personal
rights. In Europe, these policies are not ends in themselves, but rather means of realizing a broader
project. The Treaty of Rome and the European Convention and the courts they establish are part of an
integrated and ambitious effort to replace the national structures that proved so unsatisfactory for much
of the twentieth century with a European-wide federal state.

To appreciate this point, some historical perspective is necessary. The identity of states is
contingent and in flux, even if not to the same degree as regimes. In 1783 there existed thirteen
independent, albeit cooperating, sovereignties along the Atlantic coast of North America; by 1789 the
cooperating states had become one. In the south of Europe, many principalities, kingdoms and the like
became the Italian state, and in the north a single German Reich, during the middle of the nineteenth
century. We recently have seen state decompositions (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Indonesia).
Projects to integrate Latin America, portions of the former Soviet empire, and various parts of the
Pacific Rim are under way, although none has gone nearly as far as the European experiment. 124 The
phenomenon is sufficient frequent, however, for us to regard the current experiment in European state
building as representative of a potentially broader phenomenon.

Consider the specifics of the European project. In Europe, fifteen (as of 2004, twenty-five)
nominally independent states have transferred significant policymaking and bureaucratic discretion
to the organs of the European Community (the EC, the principal component of the EU), and have
proposed giving the EU a broader role in framing a common foreign and defense policy on their
behalf. In particular, the European Court of Justice generates a considerable body of interpretive law,
which the courts of the members of the EU regard as having direct effect in their countries. Meanwhile,
the 45 members of the Council of Europe (which includes all the present and prospective EU
members) have delegated to special purpose institutions substantial authority to police their human
rights performance. The Council of Europe’s judicial body, the European Court of Human Rights, has
the authority to hear suits by private persons and to fine states that have transgressed the European
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For one somewhat visionary discussion of regional integration by a respected academic, see Lester Thurow, HEAD TO HEAD:
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Convention on Human Rights; some of the member states also have incorporated this body of law
directly into their legal systems. The substantive human rights law applied by the European Court
comprises not only dignitary interests, but also economic rights such a protection against arbitrary
seizures of property.

Although the process of building European institutions rests ultimately on a series of treaties, it
also seems clear that these agreements constitute more than conventional international law.125 What
interests us about these two bodies of law is the way they enforce the international commitments that
lie at the heart of the European project. It seems clear that the edicts of the two courts, as well as the
legislation generated by the EU’s Council and Commission, have more authority than conventional
international arbitration as described above. The fundamental distinction lies in the embeddedness of
the EU and Council of Europe judicial institutions. First, they come attached to a complex of
commitments, from border administration to regulatory harmonization to criminal justice standards.
A state cannot abandon these commitments selectively, but rather must lose the benefits of all if it
wants to avoid the costs of any. Second, the commitments fit into an even larger process involving the
gradual diminution of European states and the construction of something like a single European state.
The outcome of this process remains uncertain and contested, but costs of exclusion from the broader
project serve as yet another deterrent to defaulting on the agreements. At the same time, like
conventional international arbitration, the two courts have the authority to levy fines and dispose of
valuable licenses and other administrative “new property” derived from Community law.126

We regard the fact of embeddedness and the latent threat of exclusion from a wide range of
existing and potentially broader future institutional arrangements, as important additional coercive
elements in both EU and Council of Europe Law. They suggest a blurring of domestic and international
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law, as the potential for state coercion seems practically indistinguishable from national law. For the
participants in the process of European unification, it surely is important, indeed central.

The rational-reciprocity approach offers some explanations about the decision to build coercive
enforcement into the European project. The ultimate goal of a unified Europe constitutes the investment
which demands credible promissory enforcement. The creation of a European state presents the
prospect of significant economic, political, and cultural benefits, but gradual surrender of national
sovereignty in favor of European organs puts the regimes in each state at risk of opportunism by the
others and the European organs themselves. Progress towards unification presents a complex problem
of reciprocal performance with many opportunities for confusion between defection and justified
retaliation. Expansion of the scope of the project, especially salient in a year when the number of
states in the EU will increase by two-thirds, precludes preliminary agreements as a means of building
trust.127 At the same time, the vesting of lawmaking power in the EC Commission and Council reduces
problems of verifiability by providing a political and bureaucratic process to specify challenging
issues of performance measurement in terms that judicial bodies can verify and implement.

The arguments extend to the European human rights regime, even though in the abstract human
rights commitments normally do not involve reciprocity or investment.128 Although no formal linkage
exists between the two European regimes, they function as strong complements. In particular, the EU
has required adherence to the human rights regime as a precondition of candidacy for membership. The
human rights commitments in the European Conventions, especially those directed at building political
openness, accountability and cultural tolerance, are seen as disarming some of the historical
pathologies that could make economic dislocations more difficult to tolerate. Those commitments
directed at judicial independence also expand the scale of independent coercive enforcement, as
discussed in the next section. The human rights commitments thus can be seen not just as an end in
themselves, but rather as a means of bolstering the investments contemplated by the European statebuilding project. 129
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4.

Domestic Enforcement

In recent years, considerable attention has focused on the use of domestic legal institutions, and
particularly domestic courts, to enforce international agreements. The European project, for example,
has relied not only on international judicial institutions such as the European Court of Justice and the
European Court of Human Rights, but on commitments by states to allow their domestic courts to
enforce the obligations contained in the Treaty of Rome and the European Convention. In the case of
the Treaty, the Court of Justice early on determined both that domestic courts had the obligation of
applying Community law even when in conflicted with national legislation, and that it has the final say
in determining whether domestic courts were carrying out this mission. 130 In the case of the
Convention, states have had greater freedom as to how to use their domestic courts, but the United
Kingdom’s Human Rights Act instructing domestic courts to treat the decisions of the Human Rights
Court as authority is an important example of how extensive domestic enforcement can be.131

Domestic enforcement is not limited to the Treaty of Rome and the European Human Rights
Convention. Traditionally many agreements, especially in private law, assume direct effect. The
Warsaw Convention, which governs contracts by international air carriers, overrides local contract
and tort law. The Hague Rules, which states have implemented by enacting statutes, similarly governs
contracts by international sea carriers.132 The International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement,

have conformed to our description of an embedded tribunal. For discussion of the proposal, see William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati,
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Debtor-States and an International Bankruptcy Court: The IMF Creditor Problem, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 257 (2003). The tribunal
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adopted at the end of World War II, supersedes national law regarding the enforceability of contracts
involving an exchange of currencies.133 Other examples abound.

The significance of domestic enforcement of international agreements depends on the quality and
independence of domestic courts.134 In countries with a powerful judiciary that acts free of government
control, the courts function as a significant coercive check on the capacity of the government to
renegotiate or repudiate international agreements. In the United States, for example, courts enjoy a
tradition of independence, possess the power to enjoin government officials as well as to award
damages, and operate in a culture of innovative judicial lawmaking. Their decisions, including their
choices about enforcing international agreements, remain subject to legislative override, but even the
power of Congress and the President to adopt legislation overturning judicial decisions is limited to
instances that, in the eyes of the judiciary, do not violate the Constitution. 135
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Some international agreements expressly disavow direct domestic enforcement.136 Others
expressly call for domestic judicial enforcement, either by their own terms 137 or through implementing
domestic laws.138 Many of the agreements that expressly call for direct domestic enforcement involve
private commercial transactions where the parties typically are strangers to each other and not likely
to engage in repeat play. 139 Typically the potential losses parties face have a high variance. As a
result, self enforcement is unlikely to be optimal.

There remain, however, a significant number of agreements where the intention of the parties is
unclear. Those situations force national lawmakers, and in particular domestic courts, to articulate
interpretive strategies and to construct default rules to determine the domestic effect of agreements that
fail to address the issue 140 Courts and commentators tend to approach defaults from one of two
directions. The proactive approach, as we shall term it, presumes the efficacy of domestic judicial
enforcement of international agreements and puts the burden of proof on those arguing against
intervention. It focuses only on capacity issues such as verifiability, asking whether an agreement
contains “sufficiently determinate standards” on which courts can base their actions.141 The bargaining
approach, as we shall call it, instead asks whether the agreement bargained for judicial enforcement.
Implicit in the latter is a recognition that agreements might contain a mix of verifiable and
nonverifiable conditions representing offsetting concessions, and that enforcement of only some might
upset the parties’ expectations and skew performance away from observable but nonverifiable
conditions.142
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Two recent cases illustrate how these approaches work. In Kappus v. Commissioner,143 the court
had to decide whether U.S. taxpayer resident in Canada could offset all U.S. income tax liability with
Canadian taxes paid on the same income, or instead would have to pay some portion of the U.S. taxes.
Article XXIV of the 1980 Tax Treaty between Canada and the United States seemed to require a full
credit. 144 But Section 59(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, a provision enacted after the Treaty went
into effect, capped the available U.S. credit at 90 percent. To complicate matters further, the United
States and Canada had entered into additional protocols to the Treaty in 1995 and 1997, after the
enactment of Section 59(a)(2), but neither protocol addressed Article XXIV of the original Treaty.

A court might unravel this conflict by adopting one of four possible defaults:(1) a domestic court
could enforce rights under an international agreement unless domestic legislation explicitly repudiates
the agreement;145 (2) a domestic court could treat the last enactment as controlling, but would interpret
“enactment” generously so as to treat treaty amendments as ratifications of the entire treaty; (3) as the
D.C. Circuit held in Kappus, a domestic court could treat the last enactment as binding, and interpret
“enactment” as limited to the language in dispute; or (4) a domestic court could never allow a treaty
provision to supersede a statute without express legislative authorization to do so.146 This progression
illustrates a transition from the proactive to the bargaining approach, as each successive move reflects
an incremental reluctance on the part of the judiciary to hold the government to its treaty
commitment.147
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337 F.3rd 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Convention Between Canada and the United States of America with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Art.
XXIV(4)(b), Sept. 26, 1980, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11,087.
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A variant of this approach would call on courts to interpret legislation so as not to violate an international agreement. See
Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). For an extreme example of this interpretive move, see United States
v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (interpreting statute intended to bar establishment of a PLO
observer mission at the United Nations as limited by earlier treaty regarding the UN headquarters); Harold H. Koh, Transnational
Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2373-75 (1991) (praising decision as exemplary interpretive strategy).
146
Cf. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE § 7852(d)(1) (specifying relationship between tax treaties and Internal Revenue Code).
147
On the analogous issue of the efficacy of the Uniform Commercial Code’s generous contract-creation rules, see Robert E.
Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, note 16 supra.
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In Chubb & Sons, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines,148 the court had to decide what law governed a dispute
over the misdelivery of goods shipped by international air carrier. The flight originated in South
Korea and ended in the United States, presumptively bringing the transaction under the Warsaw
Convention. A complicating factor, however, was the existence of several versions of that multilateral
Convention, one of which the United States had joined in 1934 and a later version of which Korea had
embraced in 1967. The court had to decide whether an agreement existed between the two countries
as a result of their acceptance of overlapping but distinct obligations.149

A proactive approach would invoke a pro-agreement default on the theory that judicial
enforcement of some obligations is preferable to no enforcement. One could find a template in § 2-207
of the Uniform Commercial Code, which allows courts to make a judicially enforceable contract in
cases where an offer and acceptance do not match. 150 Alternately, as the Ninth Circuit did in Chubb,
a court might require something closer to the common law’s mirror-image rule to limit treaty relations
to instances where states had assumed identical obligations.151 This default implements the idea that
parties might regard the total bargain as motivating performance and correspondingly consider partial
enforcement as an unwanted outcome.

What we find interesting about both cases is the implicit relationship between judicial coercion
and the international agreement. In both cases, the degree of domestic enforcement of an international
agreement turns on which template the courts will use. Kappus implicates the level of domestic
lawmaking required to free a court of its responsibility to enforce an international agreement, while
Chubb considers the level of international interaction required for enforceable obligations to arise.
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214 F.3rd 301(2nd Cir. 2000) cert. denied, 533 U.S. 928 (2001).
149
The existence of treaty relations determined both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court that heard the case and
the substantive rules for determining liability and damages.
150
UCC § 2-207(3). The trial court in Chubb did precisely this, although it based its decision on an interpretation of the Warsaw
Convention and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana
Airlines 1998 WL 647185 (S.D.N.Y.1998).The United States was (and is) not a party to the latter instrument, although the
Department of State maintains that some portions of it have the force of customary international law.
151
The Ninth Circuit based its decision on both the general desirability of such a default and its interpretation of Article 40(5) of
the Vienna Convention.
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The former involves exit, the latter entry, but both implicate the activity level of an independent and
coercive judiciary.

Focusing only on U.S. practice, we can see that decisions about when to use domestic courts to
enforce international commitments, and when not to, is broadly consistent with the rational-reciprocity
approach. The agreements most likely to generate rights and duties that domestic courts will enforce
involve complex, private commercial transactions, where the benefits from enhancing the credibility
of reciprocal promises seem greatest and difficulties with verification of salient conditions seem
manageable. The agreements that the United States most often has directed its courts not to implement
involve open-ended human rights commitments, which, on the one hand, have great moral clarity and,
on the other hand, present vexing verifiability issues due to the nonspecific nature of the obligations.
As Kappus and Chubb illustrate, the courts also use secondary doctrines that minimize uncertainty
about judicial reinterpretation of the scope of commitments set by the political branches.

At the same time, U.S. doctrine regarding domestic enforcement of obligations contained in
international agreements is far from settled, and academic opinion largely favors a greatly expanded
role for U.S. courts, a role that the rational-reciprocity approach suggests might well be counterproductive. We do not assert that we have developed a powerful positive theory, at least as applied to
U.S. practice. Rather, we argue that the contract theory approach provides an explanation of at least
the broad outlines of U.S. approaches to domestic enforcement of international law and may provide
a basis for a normative critique of academic calls to change that practice.

C. Summary

In designing international agreements, parties can choose from an array of enforcement techniques,
including progressively more coercive measures wielded by independent tribunals. Self-enforcement
explains much about these agreements, but it is incorrect to limit analysis to this mechanism.
Moreover, the framers of international agreements must take into account not just those aspects of
enforcement to which they advert, but also the background assumptions about coercive enforcement
that independent institutions, first among them domestic courts, will employ. By adjusting these
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assumptions, independent institutions can alter the enforcement structures that attend international
agreements.

This section has described the enforcement techniques conventionally applied to international
agreements, and in particular has noted the connection between interpretive techniques and
enforcement. We have observed some support in international practice for the claim that choices about
enforcement, and the interpretive strategies that affect enforcement, reflect the theoretical framework
developed in the first part of this paper. In the next part we consider in greater detail the suggestion
made in the first part that some enforcement techniques work at cross purposes with others and explore
the implications of this suggestion for optimal enforcement strategy.

III. SELF-ENFORCEMENT AND COERCION AS COMPLEMENTS AND RIVALS IN INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

The previous part makes clear that international agreements, no less than private contracts, rely
on some mixture of self enforcement and public coercion to promote compliance. Does the similarity
between international agreements and private contracts run deeper? As we observed in Part I, a
substantial literature explores the complex relationship between self-enforcement and coercion in
private contracts, and argues that, across a significant range of transactions, coercion diminishes the
value generated by the contractual relationship.152 Here we consider the possibility that coercive
enforcement of international agreements may undermine self enforcement, and thus for some set of
obligations detract from optimal enforcement.

A. Optimal Enforcement Structure in International Agreements

A naive view of international law might regard more enforcement as always better. Some of the
international law literature seems to rest on a view that international agreements are a product that has
positive returns to both scale and scope.153 A little reflection will suggest the implausibility of this
152
153

See notes 59-67 supra and accompanying text.
We do not find bald claims in the literature, but we do note a tendency to attack any limitations on domestic enforcement that
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claim. International agreements as much as private contracts involve predictions about future states
in the face of uncertainty. When these predictions prove incorrect, rigid commitments make the parties
worse off. Knowing this, parties rationally should specify the conditions under which the obligations
contained in an agreement should not apply, rather than insist on the necessity of the commitment in
all possible future states.154 Absent complete prescience, states rationally must balance commitment
with flexibility by limiting both the scope of their commitments and the extent of the sanctions that a
violation will trigger.

We concede that conditions sometime exist where network effects argue for expanding the scope
and the scale of international agreements. An important example involves the conventions, customs
and practices that underlie the assignment of internet domain names.155 Our argument is only that most
subjects of international agreements do not have this quality, and that a significant range of agreements
entail diminishing marginal returns accompanied by increasing marginal enforcement costs. Optimizing
the value of such agreements involves finding the point where the benefits of any increase in the scale
or scope of the agreement equals the cost associated with the increase.

emerge. For influential examples of this tendency, see, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, INTERNATIONALLAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1996); Harold H. Koh, note 145 supra; Louis Henkin, note 135 supra; Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United
States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984); Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and
International Law, 71 VA . L. REV. 1071 (1985).
154
Recall that the canonical contracting problem is to ensure both efficient ex ante investment and efficient trade. To do so, parties
must balance the benefits from credible commitments against the benefits of flexibility in adjusting to realized states of the world. To
be sure, one method of ensuring flexibility is renegotiation. If the parties anticipate that the uncertainties they face at the time of
contracting ultimately will be resolved, they would logically prefer to renegotiate their initial agreement once the future is known. From
this perspective, the initial agreement is only a means by which the parties set the entitlements that will be traded ex post. If the parties
are symmetrically informed, bargaining theory teaches that they will renegotiate to the efficient result. For example, the parties could
agree to a fixed price contract that paid the promisor to invest efficiently or conditioned the price on the realized value of the
investment. In such a world, neither party can exploit the specific investments of the other strategically. The problem, however, is that
if information is asymmetric (that is, costs and valuations are not observable) either party can exploit the sunk cost investment of the
other. Under these conditions, in order to insure both efficient investment and efficient trade, parties must be able to precommit not
to renegotiate. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory, note 16 supra, at 611-614. In either state of the world, the
parties will renegotiate (or not) against the background of the enforcement mechanisms that they design. Only if the relevant values
are observable but not verifiable will they have reason to select between self-enforcement and coercive enforcement based upon the
prospect of renegotiation.
155
We note that even here the international community has not created a monolithic legal system. An independent tribunal,
working with the consent of the administrators of the internet, has the authority to resolve disputes over the ownership of domain
names, but national authorities have no obligation to respect the determinations of these tribunals. The speed and low cost of the
international process, in contrast to domestic litigation, ensures that conflicts seldom arise. When they do, however, domestic courts
are free to disregard the tribunal’s decision. For an example, see Barcelona.Com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de
Barcelona, 330 F.3rd 617 (4th Cir. 2003).
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This straightforward analysis can be extended to enforcement. Rather than specifying that an
obligation will cease to exist if certain circumstances arise, an agreement instead may present the
parties with a series of options. For any specified future state, a party may choose between
compliance and undergoing some sanction. An optimal level of enforcement requires setting the
sanction so that the marginal costs of imposing the sanction equal the marginal benefits from
compliance. And the determination of a sanction in turn implicates the choice of enforcement
mechanism, and in particular the mix of self enforcement and third-party coercion.

B. Complementarity, Rivalry and States

In Part I we reviewed evidence indicating that coercive sanctions might function as a rival to self
enforcement. As we noted, the experimental data and the conjectures about their significance relate
to individual behavior. We again must ask whether political elites exhibit similar tendencies. Does
the ex ante announcement of the prospect of coercive sanctions undermine self enforcement of
agreements to which states are parties?

Some similarities seem clear. We expect political elites to care about reputation generally, and
in particular about being known as submissive. Indeed, we expect foreign relations decisionmakers
to be more averse to this perception than average individuals, both because of qualities reinforced by
the process of elite selection and because reputational effects would involve domestic as well as
international capabilities.

Membership in a governing group, we surmise, entails surviving a selective process in which
perceptions of weakness are not rewarded. Even where advancement depends on convincing superiors
of servility, the supplicant still must present a credible image of mastery of his inferiors. We therefore
would expect that people who survive the process and become decisionmakers generally would be
willing to incur substantial costs to punish those who treat them unfairly.

Moreover, the risks of appearing weak are compounded by their consequences not just for future
international interactions, but for place within the domestic power hierarchy. We surmise that
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perceptions of weakness are generalized, rather than particular, in that observers usually do not
distinguish among contexts. Thus, an international relations decisionmaker plausibly can believe that
appearing coerced will not only encourage future demands by other states, but induce domestic rivals
to challenge his position. It seems paradoxical to expect that a regime too weak to resist coercion by
a third party nonetheless can reliably compel its population to comply with the third party’s command.
In the case of Europe, for example, governments on occasion have found themselves incapable of
squelching civil defiance of the edicts of the Brussels court. 156

We are less sure that institutionalizing coercive sanctions for international agreements induces free
riding on the part of the elites of regimes that might otherwise inflict costs on noncompliers.157
Consider the UN Security Council’s supposed monopoly under the UN Charter regarding authorization
of the use of force to punish Charter violations. The example is not perfect because the Security
Council monopoly itself is only self-enforcing, in the sense that no third-party enforcer exists to punish
states that encroach on this monopoly. Yet we can make two observations: Countries do use force to
punish violators of international law without Security Council permission, as U.S.-led coalitions did
in Serbia and Iraq, and it is unclear whether decisions not to use force in the face of clear Charter
violations reflect free riding or a belief that doing so without Security Council approval entails
additional costs.

Some ambiguous evidence of free riding comes from the field of investor protection. Before the
advent of third-party arbitration, disputes over injuries to foreign investors typically involved state-tostate intervention. In extreme cases, a great power would threaten to use military force to focus the
attention of the injuring state on the investors’ complaint. The rise of the arbitration mechanism over
the last forty years coincides with the end of gunboat diplomacy, and more generally in a reduction
of efforts by states to expend resources unilaterally on behalf of injured investors.
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See, e.g., Commission v. Greece (Case 68/880, [1989] E.C.R. 2965 (complicity of domestic officials in scheme to evade
EC customs); Commission v. France (Case C-265/95), [1997] E.C.R. I-6959 (inability of French government to manage civil strife
designed to obstruct free movement of agricultural products required under EC law). [other examples from Marshall court]
157
See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
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We do not want to make too much of this example, because of two confounding factors. First, over
the same forty-year period the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have acquired
increased influence over the policies of many states and have used threats to withhold financing as an
incentive to induce a reduction of attacks on foreign investors. To some extent, these institutions have
become enforcement agents for the capital-exporting world.

Second, the arbitration mechanism rests on treaties that create formally symmetrical obligations.
Because arbiters operate free of state control, to a certain extent they can redefine the scope of
protection provided by these treaties. The capital exporters thus have lost the ability to fix the scope
of their obligations, and have found themselves faced with claims that their own actions violate these
treaties.158 Now that their arguments can be used against them, they may have become more cautious
about supporting claims for protection. We thus concede that the evidence that coercive enforcement
of international agreement creates a free riding problem is mixed at best.

Finally, do some states, like some individuals, find coercion inconsistent with a preference for
reciprocal fairness? Both general arguments and some anecdotal evidence suggest an affirmative
answer. Introducing coercive commitments to international agreements makes some states less willing
to honor the agreements or to interpret their obligations liberally. With states as with individuals,
coercion can undermine the desire to cooperate rather than reinforce it.

Consider first the observation that some states prefer coercion because they regard international
agreements as a precommitment strategy. These countries seek to lock in currently tolerated policies
against shifting future domestic majorities.159 The argument assumes that the effects of an agreement
can be controversial and potentially unpopular, but will not generate such strong opposition as to lead
a country to withdraw from the coercive system. The critical premise is that regimes do not trust their
future selves to honor commitments, and that others should not trust them either.
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See Paul B. Stephan, note 120 supra, at 830-39.
See Ryan Goodman, note 140 supra, at 540-45 (discussing “lock-in” goal in treaties); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of
Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217 (2000) (documenting effect).
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Reciprocal fairness, however, depends fundamentally on trust in the propensity of counterparties
to behave similarly. Signals that this trust is unwarranted should compel states to alter their premises,
and in particular should induce precautions against defection. These precautions in turn further
indicate lack of trust. To the extent, then, that explicit commitments to coercive enforcement rest on
doubts about future capacity to comply, they also convey information that undermines self enforcement.

U.S. practice provides direct evidence of the tension between coercion and cooperation in the
context of international agreements. One instance involves the UN Charter. After the founding of the
United Nations and its issuance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, civil rights groups in
the United States began invoking these instruments as a ground for attacking the government’s role in
enforcing racial segregation. 160 A litigation strategy emerged in which opponents of restrictive laws
invoked these international commitments to attack the status quo. A few progressive state courts
embraced the argument, which rested on the premise that they had the authority to interpret and enforce
the UN Charter, particularly with regard to discrimination. 161 Greater reliance on internationalagreement-based judicial decisions to dismantle American segregation seemed likely.

The United States responded to this pressure by seeking to eliminate the coercive force of its
international commitments. During the early 1950s Senator John Bricker introduced versions of a
constitutional amendment that would have barred treaties from having any effect on domestic law,
absent implementing legislation. The effort won the endorsement of the American Bar Association and
at one point came within a single vote of clearing the Senate. The Eisenhower Administration
eventually fended off the movement to codify the nonenforceability of U.S. international commitments
by representing that it would not enter into any international agreement that had domestic law reform
as its purpose.162 The practice of conditioning U.S. adherence to agreements regarding domestic civil
rights on the enactment of further domestic legislation has remained the norm since that time.163
160

See Mary L. Dudziak, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 43-64 (2000).
Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2nd 481, 218 P.2nd 595 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950), vacated, 242 P.2nd 617 (Cal. 1952); Kenji
Namba v. McCourt, 185 Or. 579, 204 P.2nd 569 (Or. 1949); Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal.2nd 711, 198 P.2nd 17 (Cal. 1948).
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See 32 DEP’T STATE BULL. 820 (1955) (statement of Secretary of State Dulles that United States would not join multilateral
treaties pertaining to human rights); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV.
98, 122-23 (2000); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, note 135 supra, at 413.
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Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, note 135 supra, at 410-23.
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Critics of this episode in U.S. history emphasize its links to the defense of segregation, suggesting
that only bigotry explains the opposition to coercive invocation of international law.164 This
connection is part of the story, but fails to do justice to the complex dynamic surrounding the use of
international law in the battle against U.S. racial segregation. First, the controversy survived Brown
v. Board of Education’s definitive attack on segregation: Secretary of State Dulles gave the final
assurances that ended the push for constitutional action a year after Brown came down, and some
version of the proposal remained under consideration in the Senate until 1957.165 Second, and more
importantly, the range of support for the Bricker Amendments far exceeded that for segregation. Some
important part of the U.S. legal establishment separated the issues by supporting both the ending of
segregation and some quarantine of international law from the U.S. legal system.

In hindsight, it appears that most progress on dismantling the legal basis of segregation (which at
some level of abstraction could be described as a cooperative effort to comply with the obligations
of the UN Charter) took place after Dulles reassured the Congress that the Administration would not
use international law to pursue domestic reform. The Civil Rights Act of 1957, the sending of federal
troops to Little Rock, the Kennedy Administrations’ mobilization of the Civil Rights Division of the
Justice Department, and the civil rights legislation of the mid-1960s all unfolded against a backdrop
of no coercive international obligation. The domestic courts acquired an enlarged arsenal to use
against racial discrimination, but none involved the UN Charter or any other international agreement.

A similar, if lower-profile episode involves the GATT. President Truman signed this agreement
in 1947, relying on the authority of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Neither the 1934 Act nor the
1947 Agreement expressly addressed the issue of implementing legislation, but a handful of courts and
slightly more commentators argued that a rule of direct effect should apply. 166 Congress responded by
164

Louis Henkin, note 135 supra, at 348-49.
Duane Tananbaum, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY– A TEST OF EISENHOWER’S POLITICALLEADERSHIP 191215 (1988). In the view of contemporaries, the Supreme Court decision that undermined the Amendment supporters was not Brown,
but Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), which assuaged fears that a Senate-approved treaty might indirectly amend the Constitution.
Duane Tananbaum, supra, at 211-14.
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Cases striking down legislationas inconsistent withGATT obligations include Territory of Hawaii v. Ho, 41 Haw. 565 (1957);
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2nd 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Dist Ct. App. 1962). For the
commentators, see Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic
Law, 26 STAN. J. INT’L L. 479 (1990); Robert E. Hudec, The Legal Status of the GATT in the Domestic Law of the United
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inserting in each new trade bill language to the effect that it should not be seen as either endorsing or
rejecting the proposition that the GATT had direct effect in U.S. law.167 During the time that this
remained an open question, the GATT process focused mostly on tariff reduction and the elimination
of transparently discriminatory barriers to imports. The issue of direct effect of GATT for the most
part remained an academic question of little practical effect.

Beginning with the Tokyo Round Agreements of 1979, however, the GATT regime began to extend
to more subjects and to threaten a greater range of domestic policies. The Tokyo Agreements
represented a turn towards combating disguised discrimination, which typically involves the
appropriation of a valid regulatory objective as a (more or less) pretextual basis for barring imports.
Efforts to discourage this practice present a greater risk of interfering with legitimate public policies.
In response, some of the more problematic commitments contained express language barring coercive
enforcement.168

The further broadening of the scope of international economic agreements induced even greater
commitments against coercive domestic enforcement. The 1993 NAFTA, which took shape during the
Uruguay Round and in significant respects reflected it, provided the first occasion for Congress to
state explicitly that the domestic courts could not engage in independent enforcement of the
agreement.169 The following year Congress applied exactly the same conditions to the Uruguay Round
Agreements, which superseded as well as extended the 1947 GATT.170

States, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 187 (Meinhard Hilf, Francis G. Jacobs & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds. 1986);
John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 260 (1967);
Note, The United States Participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 505 (1961).
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See Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 916 F.2nd 903, 908 (3rd Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S.
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North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, § 102, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 3312. The Act does carve out
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Neither the human rights nor the GATT case study proves that the United States displayed a more
cooperative attitude toward potential partners in multilateral agreements because it was free of the
threat of coercive enforcement by independent domestic courts. We recognize that other factors might
explain both the periods of cooperation and the earlier conservatism about international commitments.
We still find it interesting that, in these two disparate areas and at two different times, U.S. efforts to
exhibit cooperative compliance with its international obligations coincided with strong measures to
discourage coercive enforcement.

C. Creeping Coercion

Up to this point our analysis has assumed that coercive enforcement attached to an international
agreement operates in an ex ante fashion on the basis of deliberate choices by the framers of the
agreement. But, as U.S. experience with the UN Charter and the GATT illustrates, the prospect of
coercive enforcement can arise after the fact or function as an uncertain background risk at the time
of entering into an agreement. In the case of arbitration commitments, the scope of the obligation may
be indeterminate, both as to what constitutes a protected investment and as to what constitutes an
compensable encroachment. 171 Both the economic obligations embedded in the EU and the human
rights commitments embedded in the Council of Europe have changed in surprising ways over time
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Consider some of the issues that have led to NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration: The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Final
Award (Jun. 26, 2003) (egregious misconduct in civil trial leading to enormous damages manifestly a denial of justice subject to
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as a result of judicial creativity. 172 And the process of internalization of international rules by domestic
courts, based as it is on highly flexible doctrine and nonspecific criteria, undermines predictability. 173

If foreknowledge of coercive enforcement can interfere with self enforcement of an agreement,
does it follow that substantial uncertainty also can reduce investments in self enforcement? We believe
that the answer is yes. First, we observe that, by hypothesis, asymmetrical uncertainty is unlikely.
Those characteristics of third-party enforcers that affect the likelihood of their future actions normally
are public knowledge, or at least are known to specialists whose services are available symmetrically. As a result, parties ought to know that doubts about coercion will affect the behavior of their
counterparties as well as their own. Both their own preferences for reciprocity and expectations about
those of their counterparties should be shaped by the knowledge that at some future date an obligation
may become subject to third-party enforcement.

Second, the logic of the arguments for the rivalrous relationship of self enforcement and coercive
enforcement of international agreements extends to the case where coercion is possible rather than
certain. The reputational effect of compliance will reflect doubts about whether the behavior will be
seen as cooperative or submissive. The possibility of coercive enforcement, not just its certainty,
should affect decisions whether to free ride rather than absorb the costs involved in sanctioning
noncompliers. Finally, uncertainty about whether compliant behavior reflects a preference for
cooperation or a fear of coercion will reduce the desire of other parties to reciprocate.

The two episodes discussed above – the United States’s resistance to judicial enforcement of the
UN Charter and to direct application of the GATT by the courts – both involved uncertainty over third-
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party coercion, not a reaction to a clear decision to provide coercive enforcement. In both cases, a few
progressive state courts had endorsed direct enforcement, but no federal court had done so and nothing
like a consensus for that result existed. The Dulles reassurances of 1955 and the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act of 1994 represented steps to foreclose possibilities, rather than decisions to reverse
any particular outcome.

We emphasize this point because most instances of coercive enforcement of international
agreements involve uncertainty rather than clear decisions incorporated into the agreement. Unless
framers make an explicit commitment against coercion, they face a positive, and perhaps substantial,
risk that third parties at some future date will take it upon themselves to compel compliance. To the
extent third-party enforcement impedes self enforcement, this risk lowers the value of international
agreements. The logical next question, then, is what meta-rules parties to international agreements
might apply to minimize the risk of unwanted future assertions of third-party enforceability.

D. The Limits of Coercion

To recapitulate our argument, self enforcement plays an important, and perhaps underappreciated,
role in the enforcement of international agreements. This role, however, is not limitless. Coercive
sanctions imposed by third parties can increase the value of commitments contained in agreements,
if (1) the commitments rest on verifiable information and (2) repeat play, reputation, and a preference
for reciprocal fairness are, for any number of reasons, ineffectual under the circumstances. The
challenge is to define the conditions for the application of third-party coercion with sufficient clarity
to avoid compromising the value that self enforcement can generate. And because third-party coercion
sometimes can be desirable and sometimes is not, the clearest meta-rules – an all-or-nothing approach
of an absolute ban on third-party enforcement or of a rule of automatic third-party enforcement – will
not work.

An obvious complication is that complete elimination of uncertainty about the availability of thirdparty coercion would be unrealistic. Neither international agreements themselves, nor any hypothetical
meta-rules for interpreting and applying those agreements, can anticipate all future states and specify
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for each whether third-party or self enforcement will apply. Instead, decisionmakers confront the
unavoidable tradeoff between accuracy and clarity, the former approach implemented by open-ended
rules that delegate to the third party considerable discretion as to whether to apply coercive sanctions,
the latter by bright-line rules that may produce both Type I and Type II errors.174 The choice of any
particular meta-rule necessarily involves accepting one or the other of these costs.

Consider as a limiting case a formalistic approach that incorporates four distinct but interrelated
interpretive defaults: (1) the third party (say, a domestic court) applies the same interpretive strategy
to all international agreements, regardless of subject or object; (2) the third party requires an explicit
reference to coercive third-party enforcement as a condition of enforceability; (3) the third party
divines obligations within an agreement only where clearly stated; and (4) the third party will allow
only those persons clearly embraced by the agreement to invoke its provisions. Applying this
approach, a court would intervene to enforce the agreement only if the agreement invoked this mode
of enforcement,175 only if the agreement clearly created an obligation relevant to the dispute before the
third party, 176 and only if the agreement applied to the person seeking to enforce it. 177 In making these
decisions, the court would not consider the subject or object of the agreement, and in particular would
not distinguish between agreements intended to benefit or protect particular classes of individuals.178

Together these defaults implement a consistent strategy, in the sense that they are necessary for a
comprehensively restrictive approach to third-party coercion. As a matter of logic, however, a thirdparty enforcer could depart from one or more of them. The issue is why. One might justify a different
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default for substantive reasons unconnected to contract theory, or because of strategies suggested by
contract-based arguments for optimal defaults.

Consider first conventional arguments that disregard contract theory. Among specialists in
international law, it has become popular to distinguish between traditional international-law
obligations and the new body of human rights law that has emerged in the years since World War II.
An early decision of the International Court of Justice, for example, noted that the postwar multilateral
human rights treaties do not aspire to “individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or . . . the
maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties.”179 Because they involve a
general humane purpose rather than bargained exchange, these instruments, the argument goes, require
distinct and generous interpretive strategies to ensure the fulfilment of their benign objectives.180

It is possible to view arguments of this sort as a variation of the claim that international law
produces economies of scale and scope, albeit limited to the particular category of human rights
law.181 In essence, it asserts that because human-rights-law obligations are so fundamentally important,
any increase in enforcement resources devoted to them would produce a positive return. Domestic
judicial enforcement is simply one way of augmenting these resources.

If the premise of this argument is correct, of course, this argument is unanswerable. And perhaps
human rights rest on such incommensurable values that no cost-benefit analysis can be applied.
Scholarly debate then would have to move to second-order issues, such as whether the power to
determine which values demand super-enforcement should rest with judges or instead with more
politically accountable actors. That debate is interesting, but not the subject of this paper.
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The best we can do is express skepticism that rationalist, instrumentalist analysis is so limited.
We suspect that enforcement of even dignitary values and decency come at some cost. Moreover, if
coercive enforcement crowds out self-enforcement, then more enforcement is not only costly but also
reduces the effective level of compliance with the agreement.182 Enforcement thus can becomes
counterproductive on two separate dimensions. Perhaps the episode involving international law and
the civil rights revolution supports this point, although we understand that this inference is
controversial. In any case, rational reciprocity presents a challenge to those who would not recognize
any limits on the enforcement of this class of rights.

Consider next what contract theory might suggest about optimal defaults. On the one hand, the
literature argues that a default should represent the contract term that the parties would prefer
regarding the issue in question, were bargaining resources unlimited – what conventionally is called
a majoritarian default. 183 An alternative approach asks whether a default can correct information
asymmetries between the parties by inducing the disclosure of information that would augment the joint
value of the parties bargain – what is called an information-forcing or penalty default. 184 Consistent
with this analysis, we should speculate as to whether parties to international agreements generally
prefer coercive third-party enforcement or not, and whether any information-forcing argument exists
for choosing an alternative enforcement regime.185
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We have not done the empirical work that might provide confident answers to these questions.
Instead, we will focus on a single issue that relates to the optimal default literature. All things being
equal, do parties to an international agreement typically wish to start from a premise of reciprocal
fairness, or from a premise of chiseling and noncompliance? Should defaults, in other words, put the
onus on parties who distrust one another to articulate their suspicions, or should defaults force
bargaining states to make a case for pure self enforcement without external coercion?

The experimental evidence discussed in Part I of this paper suggests a response to this question.
Introducing the subject of failure and opportunism tends to have an unhappy effect on the resulting
agreement. People who know that they may be punished perform less well than people who know that
they may be rewarded. Forcing states to rebut the premise that they will defect may trigger the same
dynamic. Beginning with a default of no coercive third-party enforcement and then requiring the
bargaining states to stipulate deviations from this rule allows negotiations to proceed without
undermining a premise of reciprocal fairness.

Moreover, if the prospect of coercive enforcement makes some international bargains unattainable,
then uncertainty about that prospect also should impose a burden on valuable transactions into which
states might enter. Defaults that reduced this uncertainty at a reasonable cost thus would be optimal.

This analysis does not requires U.S. courts to rethink their approach to the enforcement of
international agreements. The articulated doctrine may be unsatisfactory, but the general pattern of U.S.
practice conforms to a set of defaults that restricts domestic enforcement to those instances where the
international agreement calls for it in express terms.186 Our immediate, tentative observation is simply
that international practice generally, and U.S. practice in particular, suggests that an optimal default
of no coercive enforcement already operates.

IV. CONCLUSION
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This paper represents an initial attempt to develop a general theory of the enforceability of
international agreements. We focus attention on the experimental evidence of a general, though not
universal, preference for reciprocal fairness and the possibility that reciprocity-based enforcement
mechanisms can be crowded out by coercive enforcement. Both the evidence for these phenomena in
individuals and the extension of the experimental hypotheses to international behavior remains
preliminary and tentative. We nevertheless find the implications of these hypotheses sufficiently
important to justify our analysis.

First, we need a theory that can better explain the relationship between individual preferences and
the behavior of states. International relations theory makes a first step in this direction with its
distinction between regimes and national interest. But how might a preference for reciprocal fairness
manifest itself in regime preferences? Under what circumstances would a regime expose itself to the
risk of external coercion? How do preferences vary among types of regimes, and what explains these
variations? We have made a start at answering these questions, knowing that further analysis lies
ahead.

Second, more empirical work is needed. States obviously are not amenable to the kinds of
laboratory experiments that we have described, but other techniques exist to test hypotheses about state
behavior. We have offered here a typology of enforcement mechanisms in international agreements
and made some anecdotal observations, but we do not pretend to have made a systematic study of the
field. That work also lies before us. We are confident, however, that our speculations point in the right
direction and suggest a research agenda for the field.

However tentative our conclusions may be about the nature of self enforcement and its relation to
coercive enforcement , we wish to stake out a strong methodological claim. Contract theory offers rich
and important insights for the field of international law. It has made robust contributions to our
understanding of private behavior, and we believe its extension to international bargaining and
agreements is overdue. A focus on rational behavior under conditions of limited information, which
is so important in enabling us to explain and evaluate private contracting, also can enrich our
understanding of international relations and international law. Whether rational reciprocity ultimately
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carries the day in providing a robust account of international relations and lawmaking, as we hope it
will, we are convinced that future work in international law will owe a substantial intellectual debt
to contract theory and scholarship.
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